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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Conflict of Laws-Capacity of Married Woman to Sue
For personal injuries occasioned by an automobile accident in North
Carolina, plaintiff, a resident of Ohio, brought suit- in North Carolina
against her husband, also a resident of Ohio, for his alleged negli-
gence. Defendant's motion for dismissal was denied. On appeal
defendant argued (1) that the provisions of the North Carolina Consti-
tution and statutes relating to emancipation of married women do not
apply to this plaintiff for the reason that these provisions are either
expressly or impliedly limited, in their application, to a female in this
state ;' and (2) that since a married woman cannot sue her husband
in Ohio, this suit is clearly an attempt to evade the laws of the domicile
I Brief of Defendant-Appellant, p. 5.
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of the parties, and should not be permitted.2 The court, by Clarkson,
J., held that the Martin Act,3 which has been interpreted as giving a
wife the right to sue her husband,4 is not limited to residents of North
Carolina, but applies to any female who while in this state becomes the
owner of a cause of action. Stacy, C. J., looking at the conflict of laws
aspect of the problem, pointed out in a concurring opinion that the
cause of action arose in North Carolina and is being sued on here, there-
fore, the law of North Carolina governs, both as to substance and pro-
cedure; that the law of the forum is alone applicable to the question of
the wife's capacity to sue, citing Howard v. Howard;5 and that the
Martin Act gives substantive rights as well as remedial ones, inasmuch
as it makes the recovery by a wife for personal injuries her "sole and
separate property", and. thus gives substance to an otherwise meaning-
less right to sue.
The three-justice dissent in effect held that the capacity of a wife
to sue is determined by her domicile. The reasons given for such a
rule were: (1) the marital status is "determined" by the law of the
domicile, (2) a cause of action is a species of personal property, and
"the situs of the ownership of personal property is the residence of the
owner" (it was admitted, however, that the situs of ownership follows
the owner, and that as long as plaintiff remained in North Carolina,
its law would govern such ownership), and (3) from a practical
standpoint, even though plaintiff should recover in North Carolina, she
would have to sue on the judgment in Ohio, and there would be "met
at the threshold of that suit by her disability".
The first problem the court had before it was to distinguish be-
tween status and the incidents of status. This is elementary. In
brief, it may be stated that under any theory of conflict of laws, the
state which sets up a status or relationship, does not necessarily control
the incidents of that status when it is moved to another state.6 Keep-
'Id. at 6 and 7.
IN. C. CoDE A ;N. (Michie, 1939) §2513.
'Crowell v. Crowell, 180 N. C. 516, 105 S. E. 206 (1920); Roberts v. Roberts,
185 N. C. 566, 118 S. E. 9 (1923); Shirley v. Ayers. 201 N. C. 51, 158 S. E.
840 (1931); York v. York, 212 N. C. 695, 194 S. E. 486 (1937).
5 200 N. C. 574, 158 S. E. 101 (1931).
6 Polydore v. Prince, 19 Fed. Cas. No. 11,257 (D. C. Me. 1837) ; New York
Foundling Hospital v. Gatti, 9 Ariz. 105, 79 Pac. 231 (1905) ; Deacon v. Jones,
7 Cal. App. (2d) 482, 45 P. (2d) 1025 (1935); Woodworth v. Spring, 86 Mass.
321 (1862); Ross v. Ross, 129 Mass. 243 (1880); Gray v. Gray, 87 N. H. 82,
174 Atl. 508 (1934). An excellent example of this is the treatment which has
been given to capacity to contract as an incident of the marital status. It may
be controlled by the law of the domicile, Marks v. Germania Say. Bank, 110 La.
659, 34 So. 725 (1903) ; Freret v. Taylor, 119 La. 307, 44 So. 26 (1907) ; Lorio
v. Gladney, 147 La. 930, 86 So. 365 (1920); Armstrong v. Best, 112 N. C. 59,
17 S. E. 14 (1893); Hanover Nat'l Bank v. Howell, 118 N. C. 271, 23 S. E.
1005 (1896); Young v. Hart, 101 Va. 480, 44 S. E. 703 (1903); Dulin v. McCaw,
39 W. Va. 721, 20 S. E. 681 (1894), or by the law of the place where the con-
tract was executed, Meier & Frank Co. v. Bruce, 30 Idaho 732, 168 Pac. 5
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ing this distinction in mind, and assuming that the forum recognized
as valid the marital status or relationship of the parties before it, the
remaining question before the court was what law governs an incident
of that relationship, namely, capacity to sue or be sued. In answering
this or any other conflict of laws question the court may choose as its
basic theory either the traditional territorial or vested rights doctrine,
or the more modem "realistic" approach.
According to the traditional view, the laws of a state have no force
outside the borders of that state ;7 but in the interests of comity a statc
having a legal situation foreign to it dumped in its lap, will enforce
rights or liabilities acquired or imposed under the laws of the foreign
state where the situation arose,8 unless this would be -ontrary to its
public policy.9  The conception is that a person who has come under
the jurisdiction of a state by reason off being physically or construc-
tively present therein may there acquire by his acts certain rights or
obligations which, in so far as they are presently actionable in the courts
of that state, follow him wherever he goes, and may be enforced by the
courts of other states if they so desire, but only as granted or imposed1 o
As a matter of practicality the forum, in enforcing this vested or
foreign-acquired right or obligation, uses its own procedural rules, 1
(1917) ; Palmer Nat. Bank v. Van Doren, 260 Mich. 310, 244 N. W. 485 (1932) ;
Ohio v. Purse, 263 N. W. 872 (Mich. 1935); Taylor v. Sharp, 108 N. C. 377,
13 S. E. 138 (1891) ; RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT op LAWS (1934) §333, or by the
law of the place of performance when the parties intend that law to govern, Kiess
v. Baldwin, 74 F. (2d) 470 (App. D. C. 1934); Greenlee v. Hardin, 157 Miss.
229, 127 So. 777 (1930) ; Poole v. Perkins, 126 Va. 331, 101 S. E. 240 (1919) ;
Jefferis v. Kanawha Fuel Co., 182 Wis. 203, 196 N. W. 238 (1923). It is quite
obvious, then, that the capacity to contract, as an incident of the marital status,
does not depend on the law of the place 'where the status or relationship was
entered into.
Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. of N. Y., 120 N. E. 198, 224 N. Y. 99 (1918);
Mertz v. Mertz, 271 N. Y. 466, 3 N. E. (2d) 597 (1936) ; STORY, COMMENTARIES
ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (8th ed. 1883) §7; RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS
(1934) §1; see Howard v. Howard, 200 N. C. 574, 578, 158 S. E. 101, 103 (1931).
' See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U. S. 113, 163, 16 Sup. Ct. 139, 143, 40 L. ed. 95,
108 (1894) ; it re Chase, 195 N. C. 143, 148, 141 S. E. 471, 473 (1927) ; Howard
v. Howard, 200 N. C. 574. 578, 158 S. E. 101, 103 (1931).
Franklin Sugar Refining Co. v. Mullen Co., 7 F. (2d) 470 (D. Dela. 1925);
Howard v. Howard, 200 N. C. 574, 158 S. E. 101 (1931).
1* "But When such a liability is enforced in a jurisdiction foreign to the place
of the wrongful act, obviously that does not mean that the act in any degree is
subject to the lex fori, with regard to either its quality or its consequences. On
the other hand, it equally little means that the law of the place of the act is
operative outside its own territory. The theory of the foreign suit is that, al-
though the act complained of was subject to no law having force in the forum,
it gave rise to an obligation, an obligatio, which, like other obligations, follows
the person, and may be enforced wherever the person may be found." Holmes,
J., in Slater v. Mexican Nat'l Ry., 194 U. S. 120, 126, 24 S. Ct. 581. 582, 48 L.
ed. 900, 902 (1904). See also GooDRICH, HANDBOOK OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
(1927) 10.
"Ingle v. Cassady, 208 N. C. 497, 181 S. E. 562 (1935); Clodfelter v. Wells,
212 N. C. 823, 195 S. E. 11 (1937); RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934)
§585.
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and looks to the locus only for instructions as to the substance of the
case.
The modern approach or analysis is to disregard the purported
logic and simplicity of the vested rights theory and to treat the forum
as a law unto itself. It formulates its conflict of laws rules as it would
those in any other field of the law, unfettered by any preordained con-
ceptions as to what law must govern the case, being free to pick any
state among those involved in the case as the one whose law ought to
govern.1 2 Just as under the vested rights theory, considerations of con-
venience call for application of the procedural rules of the forum
regardless of the locus whose substantive law is picked as controlling.
So, if the court follows the orthodox, traditional view, it must first
determine whether the particular point before it involves substance or
procedure. If the forum should hold that capacity to sue or be sued,
as a conflict of laws problem, is a question of substance, it must,
under the vested rights theory, apply the local' law of that state where
the substantive rights arose; if it deems it procedural, it applies its
own local law to decision of the question. The general rule is that
capacity of a married woman to sue is a procedural question to be
resolved by the local law of the forum.18 The North Carolina view,
according to Howard v. Howard,14 appears to be that capacity of a
wife to sue or be sued is a question of substance, part of the cause of
action, to be controlled by the local law of the state giving the cause of
action. In that case a North Carolina wife suing her husband in North
Carolina was denied recovery because the cause of action on which she
was seeking to recover-an automobile accident-arose, if at all, in
New Jersey, and since New Jersey would not allow a wife to sue her
husband, this wife had no cause of action. The court having im-
pliedly' 5 classified capacity of a wife to sue as substantive, this decision
was in full accord with the strict territorial view-plaintiff's right to sue
her husband, accorded by the statutes of her domicile as an incident
of the marital status in that state,10 being denied by the court of her
domicile l' because her substantive rights, of which capacity to sue
is one, arose in another state.
11 See, for an example of this approach, the articles of Cook, The Logical and
Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws (1924) 33 YALE L. J. 457; The Jurisdiction
of Sovereign States and the Conflict of Laws (1931) 31 COL. L. Rav. 368; Tort
Liability and the Conflict of Laws (1935) 35 CoL. L. Ray. 202.
11 New York Evening Post Co. v. Chaloner, 265 F. 204 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1920);
Gott v. Dinsmore, 111 Mass. 45 (1872); Rogers v. Rogers, 265 Mo. 200, 177 S.
W. 382 (1915); RESTATEMENT, CONFLIC ' or LAws (1934) §588.
"200 N. C. 574, 158 S. E. 101 (1931).
There was no express determination of the question, the court apparently
assuming that capacity to sue was a part of the-cause of action.
1 See note 4, supra.
1Dawson v. Dawson, 224 Ala. 13, 138 So. 414 (1931); Buckeye v. Buckeye,
203 Wis. 248, 234 N. W. 342 (1931). Compare with such a view the holdings
[Vol. 19
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If, on the other hand, the court looks upon itself as its own master,
in accord with the "liberal" analysis, it still has before it the primary
hurdle of substance or procedure. If this hurdle is cleared in favor
of procedure, the rule of the forum will govern.' s If, however, sub-
stance is found on the other side, then the court may settle on the law
of any state in the picture which it thinks ought to govern-the lex loci
celebrationis,19 the lex domicilii,2 0 the lex loci delicti or contractus,2 1
or the lex foi.2 2 How it is to make this selection is beyond the scope
of this note. Howard v. Howard will fit into this analysis by merely
saying that it holds capacity of a married woman to sue to be governed
by the law of the place which controls the substance of the case.
The principal case could have been disposed of simply by saying
that capacity to sue is a question of substance, to be resolved by the
law of the place of tort. North Carolina being that place, its law will
govern, and plaintiff wife may bring this suit against her husband. The
opinions in the case torture the problem, however, and never quite work
their way out of confusion. Justice Clarkson simply evaded the prob-
lem in conflict of laws and rested his decision on the technical basis
that the female plaintiff was "in this state" when her cause of action
arose, and therefore the Martin Act applies. The effect of her
domiciliary incapacity to sue was not discussed. Chief Justice Stacy's
opinion more closely approaches a sound reason for allowing the plain-
tiff to recover. The fact that the forum and the locus delicti are the
same makes his point as to substantive and procedural questions being
controlled by the forum a neat one. But it leaves no guidepost to indi-
cate in future cases, where the forum and locus might be different,
whether capacity of a married woman to sue is a question of procedure
or substance. His statement that the forum controls questions of capa-
city to sue could act as such a guidepost and completely dispose of the
in Armstrong v. Best, 112 N. C 59, 17 S. E. 14 (1893) and Hanover Nat. Bank
v. Howell, 118 N. C. 271, 23 S. E. 1005 (1896).
16 See note 13, supra.
1 There has been no case found which has actually held that the place which
created the status, when different from the domicile, would control the incidents
thereof, but it is entirely possible that a court might so hold in the absence of
contrary precedent.
"Williams v. Pope Mfg. Co., 52 La. Ann. 1417, 27 So. 851 (1900) ; Freret
v. Taylor, 119 La. 307, 44 So. 26 (1907) ; Little Players Film Co. v. Harcol Film
Co., 1 La. App. 388 (1925).
I'Dawson v. Dawson, 224 Ala. 13, 138 So. 414 (1931); Buckeye v. Buckeye,
203 Wis. 248, 234 N. W. 342 (1931).
" Tex. & Pac. Ry. v. Humble, 181 U. S. 57, 21 Sup. Ct. 526, 45 L. ed. 747(1901); Lee v. Puleston, 102 Fla. 1079, 137 So. 709 (1931); Beck & Gregg
Hardware Co. v. Southern Surety Co., 44 Ga. App. 518, 162 S. E. 405 (1931);
Herzog v. Stern, 264 N. Y. 379, 191 N. E. 23 (1934); Dunn Co. v. Corwin,
258 App. Div. 609, 17 N. Y. S. (2d) 577 (1st Dep't 1940). Accord: Byrd v.
;tna Life Ins. Co., 25 Ala. App. 318, 146 So. 78 (1933); Fowlkes v. Ray-O-Vac
Co., 183 S. E. 210 (Ga. App. 1935).
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case if the authority he cites, Howard v. Howard, bore him out. His
argument that the Martin Act, by giving substance to an otherwise
meaningless right to sue, thereby gives substantive rights to the plaintiff
would seem to beg the question, for the whole problem before the court
is by what law the plaintiff's procedural and substantive rights are to be
determined.
From the practical side, the dissent points out entirely possible
difficulties in enforcing the judgment, but this should not deter the
court from going along with the plaintiff as far as possible. Its theo-
retical reasons show a confusion between status and the incidents of
status, and a failure to distinguish between a cause of action and the
proceeds of a cause of action. Certainly if the situs of ownership of a
cause of action follows the person of the owner, as admitted by the
dissent, that ownership in the principal case is to be determined by
North Carolina law as long as the plaintiff is in North Carolina. Once
she has recovered on that cause of action, it would seem to cease to be
a cause of action and would become a judgment enforceable under the
full faith and credit clause.28 Furthermore, no doubt there was an
insurance company in the background, which it seems would be obliged
to pay the judgment once rendered.
SAMuEL R. LEAGER.
ConstitutionalLaw-Escheats and Abandoned Property
In its origin, escheat was a comparatively simple element of the
law of property. It denominated, in its most usual form, the right of
the state or the sovereign td real property whose owner had died intes-
tate and without lawful heirs, and it was this form of escheat which was
originally incorporated into the North Carolina law.' Its scope was
enlarged contemporaneously with its introduction, however, to include
unclaimed 'distributive shares of a decedent's personal estate as well as
his realty.2 Strictly speaking, only when the owner of property dies
intestate and without heirs can there be an escheat.
Of recent years there has been a tendency among the states to in-
clude in their statutes provision for the "escheat" to the state of un-
claimed funds or personalty,3 and in certain cases realty,4 held by one
person for another, or owed by one person to another-the most notable
28U. S. CoNsr., Art. IV, §1; RESTATEmENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) §434.
1 N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §5784; University v. High Point, 203 N. C.
558, 166 S. E. 511 (1932).2 N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §5785.
3 ALASICA Compv. LAws (1933) §2903; Auz. REv. CODE ANN. (Struckmeyer,
1928) §266; CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. (Deering, 1937) §1273; MxCH. STAT. ANN.(1937) §26.1025; ORE. CODE ANN. (1930) §11-1215; PA. STAT. (Purdon, 1936)
tit. 27, §§282-437.
'PA. STAT. (Purdon, 1936) tit. 27, §§332, 333.
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source of such "escheatable" property being unclaimed or dormant bank
deposits. From the strictly historical viewpoint, this is not a true
escheat since the customary basis, i.e., death, intestacy, and lack of heirs
of the owner, is not present. It partakes more of the nature of aban-
doned property, where the possibly living owner has parted with all
interest in the property, leaving it to be claimed by the first taker or by
the state if it sees fit to legislate concerning its potential control over
such property.5
Whether the ordinary modem statute be called an escheat statute
or an abandoned property statute, or a combination of both, its enlarge-
ment to include all kinds of property for which there is no apparent
lawful owner has raised new questions of constitutionality and of prac-
tical administration which did not originally exist.
Foremost among ithe constitutional problems is that of compliance
with the requirements of -substantive and procedural due process of
law.6 Substantive due process concerns the basis for the state's right
to take over the escheated or abandoned property.1 As for escheats,
the North Carolina constitution expressly provides for their acquisition
by the state.8 There is no similar federal constitutional or statutory
provision, so it would seem that the state's right in such case is un-
questionable. Again, there is no federal constitutional or statutory
provision for the recovery of abandoned property, but even if there
were, the state would have admitted jurisdiction and control over tangi-
ble or intangible property within its borders.9 Where there is a true
escheat or a true abandonment, the state clearly has a right to the
property.
Obviously, from the nature of escheat and of abandonment, it
would be practically impossible to find a pure case of either. In escheat,
if it were possible to prove that a property owner had died intestate,
it would still be necessary to show that there were no heirs to take
the property. North Carolina has a presumption of law that every
person dying leaves heirs, and it has been held, in an ejectment suit
brought by the University to recover land by escheat, that the Univer-
sity must rebut this presumption by proof; yet this proof may be
founded on enquiries made of those most likely to know whether there
are heirs capable of succeeding to the inheritance.' 9 This is but a pre-
'Germantown Trust Co. v. Powell, 265 Pa. 71, 108 Atl. 441 (1919) ; Greenough
v. Peoples' Savings Bank, 38 R. I. 100, 94 Atl. 706 (1915).
'U. S. CONsT. Amendment XIV, §1.
"Brooklyn Borough Gas Co. v. Bennett, 154 Misc. 106, 217 N. Y. Supp. 203(Sup. Ct. 1935); Pennsylvania v. Dollar Savings Bank, 259 Pa. 138, 102 Atl.
569 (1917) ; Germantown Trust Co. v. Powell, 265 Pa. 71, 108 Atl. 441 (1919);
Greenough v. Peoples' Savings Bank, 38 R. I. 100, 94 Atl. 706 (1915).
'N. C. CONST. (1936) art. IX, §7.
' Security Savings Bank v. California, 263 U. S. 282, 44 Sup. Ct. 108, 68 L.
ed. 301 (1923). "o University v. Harrison, 90 N. C. 385 (1884).
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sumption to rebut a presumption, and appears the only practical means
to prove a lack of heirs. It would seem that a complete escheat statute
should stipulate certain facts which, if proved by the University, will
reasonably raise a presumption that the decedent had no heirs.
It would be even more unusual to find a pure case of abandonment
than one of escheat, since it involves proof that the owner has relin-
quished all his interest in the abandoned propertyl-a matter of
intent-and in practically every case the owner's intent must be pre-
sumed from his acts-disappearance, failure to deal with the property
for a certain length of time, etc. What will constitute a reasonable fac-
tual basis for such presumption should be established by any complete
abandonment statute. If what is more logically abandoned property
be termed escheated property, the problem of presumptions grows more
complicated, since it is then necessary to prove by presumptions all
three of the elements of escheat: death, intestacy, and lack of heirs.
Thus if the state can prove the essential elements of escheat or
abandonment, or if it sets up a reasonable basis for presuming such
facts as are not certain but must be proved, it will have satisfied the
requirements of substantive due process.
Some form of proceeding would seem necessary for the state to
establish its right to property in the possession of another. This raises
the question of procedural due process. However, in North Carolina
and a majority of states, the title to escheated property vests in the state
immediately upon the death of the owner,' 2 hence, there is no consti-
tutional necessity for a proceeding to determine escheat.18 Ejectment is
usually resorted to in North Carolina to dispossess one in possession
of escheated property, and it is in this proceeding that the facts of
escheat are adjudicated.' 4 This may be a sufficient means of determining
escheat, but a statutory form should be evolved which would provide
for notice to the parties in possession of the property and to other
interested parties. Notice by publication would probably be sufficient.
Such provisions would clearly satisfy the requirements of procedural
-due process.
In abandonment the requirements of procedural due process have
been clearly set forth by the Supreme Court in Security Savings
"Bickham v. Bussa Oil & Gas Co., 152 So. 393 (La. App. 1934) ; Hediger v.
Zastrow, 174 Minn. 11, 218 N. W. 172 (1928).
12 N. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §5784; Crane v. Reeder, 21 Mich. 24(1870); Farrar v. Dean, 24 Mo. 16 (1856); Roberts v. Reeder, 5 Neb. 203(1876); Den, Colgan v. McKeon, 24 N. J. L. 566 (1854).
1" Hamilton v. Brown, 161 U. S. 256, 16 Sup. Ct. 585, 40 L. ed. 691 (1896);
University v. High Point, 203 N. C. 558, 166 S. E. 511 (1932).1
'University v. Johnson, 2 N. C. 373 (1796); University v. Foy, 5 N. C. 58(1805) ; University v. Harrison, 90 N. C. 385 (1884); University v. High Point,
203 N. C. 558, 166 S. E. 511 (1932).
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Bank v. California.15 There the Court upheld a California statute pro-
viding for the "escheat" to the state of bank deposits unclaimed after
20 years. The bank was to be served personally, and the depositors
were to be served by publication, with a five-year period allowed for
those not parties to the judgment to sue to recover the money.16 The
Court held such a statutory proceeding (it was called an escheat pro-
ceeding, although it actually dealt with abandoned property) to be either
quasi in rem or strictly in rem, in either of which the-essentials of juris-
diction are seizure of the res-accompished by personal service made
-upon the bank-and reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard-
accomplished by service by publication on the depositors and a five-
year period for them to reclaim the supposedly abandoned property.
In the light of this decision any abandonment statute which hopes
to be constitutional should contain some provision for a proceeding to
determine the fact of abandonment, in which the holder of the property
or the debtor is served personally and the owner of the property or the
creditor is served at least by publication and given an opportunity to
be heard.
If such proceeding and notice is provided for, it has been held that
there is no impairment of the contract obligation which the holder of
the property or the debtor owes the owner or creditor, 17 especially if
the holder or debtor is absolved by the statute from liability to the
owner of the property.'s A subsidiary problem arises, however, when
the abandoned property is held by a national bank. The Supreme
Court held a California statute providing for the "escheat" of appar-
ently abandoned deposits in a national bank to be an interference with
the bank's function as a federal agency.' 9  However, a later federal
case upheld an Alaska statute which applied to national banks.2 0 This
statute provided that seven years' absence in which the depositor has
not been heard from raises a presumption of death, making his deposit
subject to escheat if no heirs can be found.2 ' It was distinguished from
263 U. S. 282, 44 Sup. Ct. 108, 68 L. ed. 301 (1923).
10 CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. (Deering, 1937) §1273.
"Security Savings Bank v. California, 263 U. S. 282, 44 Sup. Ct. 108, 68
L. ed. 301 (1923); Germantown Trust Co. v. Powell, 265 Pa. 71. 108 Atl. 441(1919); see Provident Institute for Savings v. Malone, 221 U. S. 660, 664, 31
Sup. Ct. 661, 663, 55 L. ed. 899, 903 (1910).
8 Louisville & N. R. R. v. Deer, 200 U. S. 176, 26 Sup. Ct. 207, 50 L. ed.
426 (1905); Security Savings Bank v. California, 263 U. S. 282, 44 Sup. Ct.
108, 68 L. ed. 301 (1923) ; see Oregon v. First Nat. Bank of Portland, 61 Ore.
551, 561, 123 Pac. 712, 716 (1912).
" First Nat. Bank of San Jose v. California, 262 U. S. 366, 43 Sup. Ct. 602,
67 L. ed. 1030 (1923). See also American Nat'l. Bank of Nashville v. Clarke,
175 Tenn. 480, 135 S. W. (2d) 935 (1940). Contra: Oregon v. First Nat'1 Bank
of Portland, 61 Ore. 551, 123 Pac. 712 (1912).
"°Alaska v. First Nat'1 Bank of Fairbanks, 22 F. (2d) 377 (C. C. A. 9th,
1927).
81ALASKA CoMP. LAWS (1933) §2903.
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the California statute which made the deposits escheatable, but made
no reference to the death, intestacy, or lack of heirs of the depositor, so
that it was possible to escheat the deposit of a living person-not a true
case of escheat. The deduction from this is that if the state were to
condition its right to escheated property on the facts, actual or pre-
sumed, of escheat, and to abandoned property on the facts, actual or
presumed, of abandonment, and make a clear-cut distinction between
the two, it would have a right to such property within its borders,
whether in a national bank or not, since the property no longer has a
lawful owner, and the state merely succeeds to the rights of the former
owner. Some such clear-cut basic distinction should be included in an
all-reaching statute.
Aside from the constitutional difficulties, certain practical problems
should be met by any complete escheat or abandoned property statute.
First of these is the sources of escheatable or abandoned property.
Escheated property should cover all the realty or personalty of an intes-
tate decedent who dies without heirs. As for abandoned property, some
states2 2 specify in particular what shall be recoverable by the state,
but it seems that all abandoned property of whatever kind should be
obtainable by the state if it sets -up a reasonable basis for the determina-
tion of its abandoned character. Certainly the holder of the property
has no tontine right or contractual right to continue in possession of it
as opposed to the state's right once the owner has ceased to regard
it as his own. 23
Another important practical problem is that of obtaining informa-
tion concerning the existence of escheated or abandoned property. A
number of states require reports to be made by the person holding or
owing abandoned property.2 4 This, coupled with the power in the
state to examine books, accounts, etc., of holders of abandoned prop-
erty,2 5 seems a popular and very practical means of obtaining such in-
formation.
Other practical problems include the office or officer to be respon-
sible for administering the statute, the mode of proceeding best suited
to the determination of the facts of escheat or abandonment, what courts
shall have jurisdiction, how much notice shall be given to interested
parties, what facts are necessary to prove as a basis for escheat or
abandonment, and what facts if proven will raise a presumption of
22 See, for instance, PA. STAT. (Purdon, 1936) tit. 27, §§282-284, 333, 334, 381,
435, 436.
" Security Savings Bank v. California, 263 U. S. 282, 44 Sup. Ct. 108, 68
L. ed. 301 (1923).
2, MIcH. STAT. ANN. (1937) §§26.1026-26.1028; PA. STAT. (Purdon, 1936) tit.
27, §§43, 262, 361, 362, 436.
"MICH. STAT. ANN. (1937) §26.1026; PA. STAT. (Purdon, 1936) tit. 27,
§§284, 437.
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escheat or abandonment (the latter two problems overlapping into the
constitutional field), the length of time to be allowed for non-parties to
the determination to come in and claim, the property, the procedure to
be followed in entering such claim, and rights of appeal from any judg-
ment of escheat or abandonment or other judgment provided for.
In sum, the required provisions of a completely constitutional and
workable escheat or abandoned property statute. are:
I. Constitutional Requirements
(1) Statement of the facts on which the state bases its right to
escheated or abandoned property--definition. (2) Reasonable factual
basis for presuming the basic facts of escheat or abandonment. (3)
Proceeding to determine existence or presumed existence of basic
facts. (4) Notice to interested parties. (5) Opportunity to non-
parties to the proceeding to claim the escheated or abandoned property.
(6) Absolution to holder of property from liability for compliance with
the statute. (7) Clear-cut distinction in definition and treatment be-
tween escheat and abandonment.
II. Practical Requirements
(1) Statement of sources of escheatable or abandoned property.
(2) Means of obtaining information concerning escheatable or aban-
doned property. (3) Detailed description of the type or mode of pro-
ceeding. (4) Detailed description of the effect of a judgment of
escheat or abandonment. (5) An office or officer to have charge of
administering the statute.
An analysis of the present North Carolina escheats statute2 6 in the
light of this summary reveals that in a test case it would probably be
held unconstitutional, and that its practical aspects leave much to be
desired. Its provisions may be classified into those dealing with real
property, and those dealing with personalty, and it is on this line that
the statute may be divided into escheats and abandoned property.
As to constitutional requirements: 1. There is no definition of escheat
on which the state may base its substantive right to escheated property.
Possibly a definition may be drawn by inference from C. S. 5784(a)
which sets forth the facts constituting a prima facie case of escheat,
but this falls short of a clear and unequivocal definition. Nor do
the sections relating to personal property27 give any definitive basis
for the state's right to the property. These sections all provide that the
personalty listed as recoverable "shall be deemed derelict property",
indicating their reliance on the abandoned property theory, though there
is no definite statement to that effect.
'0 N. C. CoDE ANn. (Michie, 1939) §§218 (c), 5784-5786 (2).
IT Id., §§5785-5786(2).
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2. However, assuming that the basis is sufficiently clear, the ques-
tion of when to presume escheat or abandonment has been dealt with.
In escheat, C. S. 5784(a) provides that if the University can show
death and intestacy of the owner of the realty,, lack of heirs will be
presumed from the failure for fifty years of any person to appear and
claim the land as devisee, grantee, or heir. This is obviously too long
for the University to have to wait to rebut the usual presumption that
everyone 'dying leaves heirs. Some provision for notice to possible heirs,
coupled with failure to respond to the notice should be sufficient to
prove absence of heirs. The present statutory basis for presuming
abandonment is a five-year period of dormancy during which no claim
to the property is made by the owner thereof, followed by a ten-year
period during which the University possesses the property subject to
claim by the owner.28 Certain qualifications to this last statement
must be made. In the case of unclaimed construction wages the initial
dormancy period is one year, and two years in the case of rebates and
returns of overcharges due by utility companies. 2 9 The section relating
to bank deposits reads: "All bank deposits in connection with which
no debits or credits have been entered within a period of five years.
• ..,,3o It would seem that tho bank could defeat the purposd of this
section by crediting interest to a savings account, and by making service
charges on a checking account. The period of dormancy should depend
clearly on the acts of the depositor and not those of the bank. In the
case of claims in a bank liquidation, the dormancy period after settle-
ment of the liquidation is three months, during which time the funds
remain in the hands of the Clerk of the Superior Court.8 ' This section
appears in the statute relating to regulation of state banks, and therefore
could not apply to national banks. The provision should be broadened
to include the latter.
3. & 4. There is no provision for a proceeding to determine the facts
of escheat or abandonment, nor is there any provision for notice to
interested parties. This defect as to abandonment is the most serious
fault of the present statute. In C. S. 5785, dealing with unclaimed
personalty or settlement of a decedent's estate, the University "is
authorized to demand, sue for, recover and collect such moneys or other
estate of whatever kind", but this is limited only to the one section,
and is insufficient to set up a 'definite procedure to be followed.
5. In all the sections dealing with personal property,3 2 with the
exception of that concerning claims in a bank liquidation, 3 it is pro-
vided that the University shall hold the property it recovers for ten
years, subject to preferment of a claim by the parties entitled thereto,
28 Ibid. "Id., §5786(2).ld., §5786(1). "Id., §218(c).
3Id., §§5785-5786(2). "Id., §218(c).
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and if no such claim be preferred, then the Uni~rersity shall hold the
property absolutely. If a proceeding were provided for at the begin-
ning of this period, this ten-year provision would be sufficient as an
opportunity to non-parties to come in and claim the property, but as it
is, it amounts to merely an extension of the period of dormancy, and
actually does not satisfy the fifth requirement.
6. In only one case, that of bank deposits,3 4 is the holder of the
property or debtor absolved from liability to the parties entitled thereto
after delivering the property or paying the money to the University.
This section provides: "The receipt of the University of North Carolina
of any deposit hereunder shall be and constitutes a release of the bank
delivering over any -deposit coming within the provisions of this section
from any' liability therefor to the depositor or any other person." This
is an excellent provision, but should be extended to cover every case of
abandoned property.
7. The distinction between escheat and abandonment is not clear-
cut, and rests more on the distinction between realty and personalty
than the basis behind the state's right to the property. This is not a
serious fault, but should be remedied if possible, since it may make a
difference iri the applicability of the statute to national banks.
As to practical requirements: Of those listed only one is met by the
present statute-that concerning the sources of escheatable or aban-
doned property. The source of escheats is limited to realty, and of
abandoned property to personalty-whose sources are listed specifi-
cally. It seems desirable to broaden the scope of the statute to include
realty and personalty in escheat, and to include all kinds of property in
abandonment. Several sources of abandoned property may thus be
opened up to the University, such as unclaimed proceeds of insurance
policies, unclaimed refundable insurance premiums, trust funds for
which there is no lawful owner, funds in hands of municipal corpora-
tions, outstanding checks, funds of all kinds in the hands of the state,
etc. There is no reason why the University should not recover all
abandoned property of whatever kind, for no one else has a right to it
superior to that of the state.
SAMUEL R. LEAGER.
Constitutional Law-Federal Power Commission-
Navigability as Prerequisite to Federal Jurisdiction.
In 1925 respondent Power Company filed with the Federal Power
Commission its declaration of intention to construct a dam across the
New River in Virginia. The New, both above and below the proposed
dam, had been navigated in places by shallow draft boats, but below
"Id., §5786(1).
19411
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
the dam there are shoals, rapids which descend eight feet to the mile,
and even an almost vertical six-foot falls.1 A large volume of water
flows through the stream during all seasons. In 1933 the Commission
found the river to be navigable, and accordingly required the respond-
ent to take out a federal license providing for certain supervision by
the Commission and empowering the government to acquire the project
after expiration of fifty years by paying the licensee's net investment.
However, in 1934, respondent began construction with. only a Virginia
state license. In 1935 the United States sought an injunction, alleging
both that the New River was navigable and that the dam would affect
the navigability of lower rivers. In 1938 the District Court2 denied the
injunction on either ground, reasoning that a river is navigable in law
when it is navigable in fact in its natural and ordinary (i.e., unimproved)
condition and therefore the New River is not navigable. The Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed,3 but implied that the proper inquiry was
whether the river is now navigable in fact, due either to natural or
artificial means. On appeal the Supreme Court4 ruled that "natural and
ordinary condition" referred to "volume of water, the gradients and
regularity of flow", 5 and a stream which has a sufficient volume and by
the use of reasonable improvements may be made navigable, is a navi-
gable stream of the United States. The Court further held that whether
reasonable improvements would make the stream navigable depends
upon a balance between the cost of the improvements and the need
for the interstate navigation made possible by the improvements.
Applying this newly formulated test to the New River, the Court
concluded that "by reasonable improvements" it could be made
navigable "for the typical, light commercial traffic of the area". 6 Hence,
it is a navigable river of the United States, subject to federal regulation
under the commerce clause, which has been construed to empower the
prohibition or licensing of any obstruction of a navigable river.7 There-
fore, in order to maintain its -dam, the respondent must procure a fed-
eral license and abide by restrictions therein.
'The United States Government mile-by-mile survey of the New River,
the 40th mile being at the dam and measuring toward its mouth, shows:
49th mile--"Rapids and shoals (mostly over boulders) 2,000 feet long; fall 4
feet to the mile." 67th mile--"River fall 5 feet in 500 feet." 79th mile--"Rapids
over two ledges, 500 feet long; fall 7 feet to the mile." Nevertheless the New
River is a navigable river of the United States.
'United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 23 F. Supp. 83 (W. D. Va.
1938).
'United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 107 F. (2d) 769 (C. C. A.
4th, 1939).
" United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 61 Sup. Ct. 291, 85 L. ed.
201 (1940).
0Id. at 299, 85 L. ed. at 208. Old. at 304, 85 L. ed. at 213.
'United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U. S. 690, 19
Sup. Ct. 770, 43 L. ed. 1136 (1898).
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The courts below, having held that the New River was not navi-
gable, had to pass on questions of federal power which the Supreme
Court avoided by its decision that the river was navigable. These
questions were: (1) Can the Federal Power Act be construed to in-
clude non-navigable streams?, (2) If so construed, is it a constitutional
exercise of the power of Congress to regulate interstate and foreign
commerce? These problems are still of vital importance, although the
new test of navigability greatly extends the possibilities of federal
control.
The core of the problem involved in the principal case lies deeper
than a mere determination of navigability. It goes back to the ques-
tion whether the state or the Federal Government is to control hydro-
electric power. The Supreme Court, in order to find a basis for fed-
eral control, used as a stepping stone the commerce clause which gives
to the Federal Government control over interstate and foreign com-
merce, which has been construed to include control over all rivers navi-
gable in carrying such commerce.8 Since the Court based its 'decision
on navigability and formulated a new test for its determination, it is
important to inquire into the legal basis of navigability where federal
jurisdiction is concerned and then into the justification for the new rule.
"Navigable" may be a word of different meanings, varying with
the legal problem involved when the word is used.9 When "navigable"
is a prerequisite to federal jurisdiction over rivers, it is construed in
the sense of the commerce clause, and the question centers on the
commerce bearing possibilities of the river. That is, if a river be ac-
tually navigated then it is capable of commerce and ipso facto warrants
federal control. But a river, presently non-navigable in fact, may have
potentialities of commercial use the obstruction of which would hinder
future commerce.
The relatively short rivers in England gave rise to the old English
rule that a river is navigable to the extent it is affected by the ebb and
flow of the tide. Our rivers are of great length, extending far beyond
the reach of the tides, thus necessitating a different rule. The classic
test of what is a navigable river of the United States was set forth in
' Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 6 L. ed. 23 (U. S. 1824); Gilman v. Phila-
delphia, 3 Wall. 713, 18 L. ed. 96 (U. S. 1865).
' Courts have not always recognized that "navigable!' may mean different things
according to the purpose at hand. For instance in cases where navigability
determines riparian and property rights, the question is determined as of the time
the original states formed the Union or new states were admitted. Thus the District
Judge apparently adopted the riparian test when he made federal control depend
on whether waters were navigable in their unimproved condition. But it is
inconceivable that the Federal Government has no power over our great canal
systems simply because they are artificial and were not navigable in an unim-
proved state. Rather, they fall within the federal sphere because they are
instrumentalities in commerce.
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The Daniel Ball:'0 "Those rivers must be regarded as public navigable
rivers in law which are navigable in fact And they are navigable in
fact when they are used or are susceptible of being used in this ordinary
condition, as highways for commerce, over which trade and travel are
or may be conducted in the customary modes of trade, and travel on
water. And they constitute navigable waters of the United States within
the meaning of the Acts of Congress in contra distinction from the
navigable waters of the State, when they form in their ordinary condi-
tion by themselves, or by uniting with other waters a continued high-
way over which commerce is or may be carried on with other states or
foreign countries in the customary modes in which such commerce is
conducted by water."
Prior to the principal case it was determined that to be navigable
a river need not be capable of bearing steam or sail vessels ;11 it need
only be capable of bearing some variety of useful commerce.12 Naviga-
bility did not follow merely because a creek would float a skiff or
canoe at high water;13 the commerce had to be of a substantial and
permanent character.' 4  Legal navigability was not defeated because
the watercourse was interrupted by occasional natural obstructions or
portages,' 5 nor because navigation was not possible at all seasons nor
at all stages of the water.' 6 The presence of artificial barriers had no
bearing on navigability in law.17
The principal case departs from the earlier law in that a stream
need neither be navigated nor capable of navigation in its present con-
dition, so long as it can be made navigable by improvements not dis-
proportionate in cost as compared with the navigation made possible.
By some it is feared that the new test renders the determination
more uncertain. This fear can scarcely be justified. Rather, the new
10 The Daniel Ball v. United States, 10 Wall. 557, 563, 19 L. ed. 999, 1001
(U. S. 1871).
"
1United States v. The Montello, 20 Wall. 430, 22 L. ed. 391 (U. S. 1874);
United States v. Utah, 283 U. S. 64, 51 Sup. Ct, 438, 75 L. ed. 844 (1930).
"
2United States v. The Montello, 20 Wall. 430, 22 L. ed. 391 (U. S. 1874) ;
United States v. Cress, 243 U. S. 316, 37 Sup. Ct. 380, 61 L. ed. 746 (1916);
Brewer-Elliott Oil & Gas Co. v. United States, 260 U. S. 77, 43 Sup. Ct. 60,
67 L. ed. 140 (1922); United States v. Utah, 283 U. S. 64, 51 Sup. Ct. 438,
75 L. ed. 844 (1930).
"United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U. S. 690, 19 Sup.
Ct. 770, 43 L. ed. 1136 (1898).
" Leovy v. United States, 177 U. S. 621, 20 Sup. Ct. 797, 44 L. ed. 914 (1894).
" United States v. The Montello, 20 Wall. 430, 22 L. ed. 391 (U. S. 1874),
United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U. S. 690, 19 Sup. Ct.
770, 43 L. ed. 1136" (1898), Economy Light & Power Co. v. United States, 256
U. S. 113, 41 Sup. Ct. 409, 65 L. ed. 847 (1920).
" St. Anthony Falls Water Power Co. v. Board of Water Comm'rs., 168 U. S.
349, 18 Sup. Ct. 157, 42 L. ed. 497 (1897), Economy Light & Power Co. v. United
States, 256 U. S. 113, 41 Sup. Ct. 409, 65 L. ed. 847 (1920).
17 Economy Light & Power Co. v. United States, 256 U, S. 113, 41 Sup. Ct.
409, 65 L. ed. 847 (1920).
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formula appears more 'definite. Under the old rule what was more
uncertain than the determination of just what was "useful commerce"
of a "substantial form"? Did not the courts apply the vague yardstick
of reasonable amount in solving these questions? Was not the number
of permissible obstructions to navigation decided by an indefinite test
of reasonable number? Those old standards were at least as tenuous
as the new inquiry of whether "streams with a sufficient volume of
water" may be made navigable by "reasonable improvements" based
on the cost and need of these improvements. Moreover, the tests are
comparable in a particular application; under the old law the question
arose whether the cost of portage around natural obstructions would
be repaid by the potential use of the rest of the waterway, and today
we ask whether the cost of removing the same obstruction will be offset
by the ensuing free flow of commerce-in other words, a comparison
of cost with need in either case.
It may be argued that until there is commercial need for a stream
to be navigated, the application of the new test to bar present obstruc-
tions is a mere subterfuge for the purpose of gaining federal control
over hydroelectric power.1 8 There is no need to bar obstructions when
there is no commerce to be obstructed. A partial answer is' that there
is far less hardship in requiring the dams to be built under federal
control than in imposing federal control after the dams are built and
future commercial need for navigation has arisen. 9 But it would be
more candid to admit that under present circumstances the navigation
involved, present or future, is not the real consideration; navigability is
simply a legal doctrine invoked, and in this case remolded, for a pur-
pose, namely to bring about federal control of hydroelectric power. The
present Supreme Court for all its realism, here seems to have paralleled
the ancient 'device of a legal fiction.
It is possible that if the new test is carried to drily logical extremes,
certain absurd results may issue. Elevated roads through marshlands
in the bayou country of Louisiana may require federal license, for they
are obstructing a body of water with sufficient volume to male canaliza-
tion possible. Similarly, fish nets may be licensed. And if the War
Department desires to exert its power to license bridges over navigable
"s Such federal control over state resources is "hotly" contested by the states,
as is evidenced by the fact that in the principal case 41 states joined with the
state of Virginia in the brief to the Supreme Court.
"9 At least one proposed dam has been abandoned because of the decision of
the principal case. The Nantahala Power & Light Co., on March 5, 1941,
abandoned its intention to construct a $35,000,000 dam on the Little Tennessee
River in North Carolina. The Power Company had -maintained that the Little
Tennessee was non-navigable, but in view of the decision of the principal case
they abandoned this contention, and rather than build subject to federal control
they abandoned the whole project.
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rivers as newly conceived, no state highway commission or private indi-
vidual may safely build any bridge without a federal license. Since by
statute20 it is criminal to obstruct a navigable stream without a license,
the bridge builders must either assume the risk of determining for them-
selves the navigability of a river or have a court decide the question.
The navigability of many streams hitherto deemed non-navigable may
under the new test become doubtful, hence much new navigability liti-
gation may be opened by the principal case.21
J. KENYON WILsoN, JR.
Contracts-Rights of Enforcement in Third Party Beneficiary.
Plaintiffs, by guardian, sue their father to recover $7,600 alleged due
them under a separation agreement between their mother and defend-
ant, under which defendant agreed to pay plaintiff's mother $25 monthly
for the support, maintenance, and education of each child until majority.
Shortly thereafter, the mother had refused to accept further payments.
Demurrer to the complaint was sustained. Held, affirmed, on the
ground that the children were only incidental beneficiaries of the con-
tract and as such, could not recover.'
Quite commonly courts do not hesitate to label a contract one "for
the benefit of a third party" even though no enforceable right is recog-
nized in the supposed beneficiary.2 Such third person beneficiaries, al-
though not parties to the contract, are classified by Williston3 and the
Restatement 4 as (1) donee,5 if the benefit to the third party is in the
nature of a gift from the promisee, rather than a performance claimable
as of right from the promisee; (2) creditor,0 if the purpose of the
promise is to 'discharge some duty owed by the promisee to the bene-
2030 STAT. 1151 (1899); 33 U. S. C. A. §403 (1928); N. C. CODE ANN.
(Michie, 1939) §§6981, 7377.11 The North Carolina test of navigability holds to the concept of "navigable
in fact" as laid down in The Daniel Ball. Previously it had held navigable those
rivers which could be navigated by a sea going vessel. In the latest case, involving
riparian rights, however, both The Daniel Ball and the sea vessel tests were
applied. It is to be expected, however, that the state courts will look on this
new formula with acute disfavor and will not adopt a test so detrimental to state
control over the state's own resources.
" Percival v. Luce, 114 F. (2d) 774 (C. C. A. 9th, 1940).
' Baurer v. Devenes, 99 Conn. 203, 205, 121 Atl. 566, 567 (1923).
1 2 WILLISroN, CoNTRAcTs (rev. ed. 1936) §356.
'RESTATEmENT, CoT AcrS (1932) §133.
r Id. §133, Illustration 2 (la) : C is a troublesome person who is annoying A.
A dislikes him but believing the best way to obtain freedom from annoyance is to
make a present, secures for sufficient consideration a promise from B to give C
a box of cigars. C is a donee beneficiary.
Id. §133, Illustration 8 (lb): B promises A for sufficient consideration to
furnish support for As minor child C, whom A is bound by law to support.
C is a creditor beneficiary.
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ficiary; (3) incidental,7 if the benefits to him under the contract are
merely incidental to the performance. There is no dispute as to the
rule concerning incidental beneficiaries; they have no rights in the con-
tract.8 Nearly all jurisdictions recognize a directly enforceable right,
at law and equity, in beneficiaries of either the donee or creditor type;
no distinction between them is made or called for in most situations.9
A minority group of courts refuse to recognize any rights in any type
of third party beneficiaries.1 0
The early cases recognizing the rights of third party beneficiaries
justified recovery on diverse theories as trust relationship,"1 equitable
subrogation,12 agency,' 3 effectuation of the intention of the parties by
creating a duty and privity or implying a promise and obligation,' 4
equitable consideration apart from legal principles.15 Today, most juris-
dictions simply state the rule that one for whose direct benefit a contract
is made, although not a party to the agreement and not furnishing
consideration, may maintain an action against the promisor.16 The diffi-
culty lies in ascertaining when the beneficiary falls within the protected
class. Solution is sought in the manifestation of the promisee's intent
as to how or by whom his promise is to be enforced.17 Various formu-
'Id. §133, Illustration 11 (1c): B contracts with A to erect an expensive
building on A's land. C's adjoining land would be enhanced in value by perform-
ance of the contract. C is an inwidental beneficiary.
' Swift Lumber &I Fuel Co. v. Hock, 124 Neb. 30, ?45. N. W. 3 (1932) (in
suit to recover for fuel oil furnished D, D not allowed to counterclaim on con-
tract between P and D's lessor containing a guaranty on oil burners, on ground
that D not of the class intended to be benefited) ; Haines v. Pacific Bancorpora-
tion, 146 Or. 407, 30 P. (2d) 763 (1934) (P could not enforce a contract
wherein D -promised X to purchase stock of P's as incidental to purchase of
other stock); RESTATEMENT, CONRAcrS (1932) §147.
1 'Hendrix v. Lindsay, 93 U. S. 143, 23 L. Ed. 855 (1876) ; Smith v. Wilson,
9 F. (2d) 51 (C. C. A. 8th, 1925); Myerson v. New Idea Hosiery Co., 217 Ala.
153, 115 So. 94 (1927); Calhoun v. Downs, 211 Cal. 766, 297 Pac. 548 (1931)
(statutory provision); Weinberger v. Van Hassen, 260 N. Y. 294, 183 N. E.
429 (1929) (P, minor, allowed to recover on contract between mother and D,
stranger, for support and education); Carrell v. Greensboro Water Supply, 124
N. C. 328, 32 S. E. 720 (1899) (P allowed recovery on contract between city of
Greensboro and D by which D was to furnish water supply of sufficient force to
protect inhabitants against fire); Boone & Jervey v. Boone, 217 N. C. 722, 9
S. E. (2d) 283k (1940) ; Re Thienhaus, 175 Wis. 526, 185 N. W. 531 (1921).
See cases collected in Note (1932) 81 A. L. L 1271.
Union Pacific Ry. v. Durante, 95 U. S. 576, 246 L. Ed. 391 (1877) ; Crawford
v. Wilson, 139 Ga. 654, 78 S. E. 30 (1913) ; Sell v. Steller, 53 N. J. Eq. 397, 32
Atl. 211 (1895) ; Sweeney v. Houston, 243 Pa. 542, 90 Atl. 347 (1914) ; Urguhart
v. Ury, 27 Tex. 7 (1856); Matheny v. Ferguson, 55 W. Va. 656, 47 S. E. 886(1904).
Palmer v. Bray, 136 Mich. 85, 98 N. W. 849 (1904); Green v. McDonald,
75 Vt. 93, 53 Atl. 332 (1902).
"
0 Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N. Y. 268 (1859); Cox v. Skeen, 24 N. C. 220, 38
Am. Dec. 691 (1842) (promisee treated as agent for P).
1' Brewer v. Dyer, 7 Cush. 337 (Mass. 1851); Tweeddale v. Tweeddale, 116
Wis. 517, 93 N. W, 440 (1903).1 Peoples Bank v. Winter, 161 Ga. 898, 132 S. E. 422 (1926).
1 See note 9 supra.
17 WrLLi oN, op. cit. supra note 3, §356A.
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laic tests have been articulated, all partaking of the vague generality
inherent in a concept of intent. It has been said that the contract must
evidence the assumption of a "direct obligation" to the third party ;",
that the contract must be "expressly" for the benefit of the third party
but need not be "solely" or "exclusively" so ;19 that the intent must be
clearly manifested in the terms of the contract;20 that a benefit inci-
dentally accruing from performance is not sufficient, instead that a
direct benefit must be shown to have been within the contemplation of
the promisee or of both parties.21 These are at best shadowy guides.
In essence they resolve into an effort to distinguish those contracts
motivated by deliberate intent to confer a direct benefit on the third
party beneficiary, from those which spring from some other intent but
whose realization will benefit him collaterally. The instant case pro-
fessed to follow the general rule that a third party might sue only if
it appeared that the contract was intended for his direct benefit, not if
he was merely an incidental beneficiary. As its test, the court asked
"who was the direct recipient of the money ?1122 Since the promise
named the mother as sole payee, the benefit to the children was held
indirect, constituting them merely incidental beneficiaries. Is such a
mechanical test sufficiently infallible that it may be relied upon to the
exclusion of other factors?
Heretofore a child has not been denied the right to sue on contract
between his father and mother providing for his maintenance. 23 Ordi-
narily this right has been predicated on the third party beneficiary doc-
trine, with public policy admittedly a determining factor. In Brill v.
Brill,24 the contract called for payment to the mother in the capacity of
guardian; in the North Carolina case of Thayer v. Thayer,2 5 the puta-
tive father promised support and education of the child, without stipu-
lation as to whether payment was to go directly to the child or the
mother in his behalf. The technical distinction that the promise of
payment in the principal case was to the mother scarcely warrants a
difference in result.26 The underlying circumstances closely correspond13Byran Lumber & Supply Co. v. Page, 109 Conn. 256, 146 Atl. 293 (1929).
" Le Ballester v. Redwood Theatres, 1 Calif. App. 447, 36 P. (2d) 827
(1934) ; Watson v. Amer. Creosote Works, 84 P. (2d) 431 (Okla. 1938).
' See cases collected in Note (1932) 77 A. L. R. 21.2' Durnherr v. Rau, 135 N. Y. 219, 32 N. E. 49 (1892).
" Percival v. Luce, 114 F. (2d) 774, 775 (C. C. A. 9th, 1940).
2"Di Girolma v. Di Matteo, 108 N. J. Eq. 592, 156 Atl. 24 (1931) (hospital
placed child in care of D on agreement that child was to inherit part of his
estate, and recovery allowed child when D left his property to wife). On 2
WiLr.sTox, op. cit. supra notd 3, §356, it is said at page 1044: "Everywhere, the
child is permitted to maintain the action, and usually as a third party beneficiary."
-"282 Pa. 276, 127 Atl. 840 (1925) ("public policy").
189 N. C. 502, 127 S. E. 553 (1925) (recovery allowed on the contract,
with intimation that recovery could also be had on statutory grounds).
" As said in Brill v. Brill, 282 Pa. 276, 282, 127 Atl. 840, 842 (1925), the
proper inquiry is whether ". . . the fact that the money is to be paid to the third
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to those cases which have allowed suit on the contract, and there appears
scant justification for inferring a contrary intent here. The infancy of
the instant beneficiaries affords an obvious reason for naming the
mother recipient of the money. Although direct performance to the
beneficiary may be a normal prerequisite to a right to sue, it shoukl
not stand as an inequitable sine qua non in the face of clear intent,
such as appears here. No urgent reason appears for the harshly narrow
construction adopted by the court. It appears almost slavish adherence
to formalism.
The dissenting judge27 advocated a recovery on the theory that
plaintiffs were the beneficiaries of a trust obligation in the mother to
collect the money for the sole use of plaintiffs. Such an approach ap-
pears sound since trusts have long been a flexible instrument for the
working of justice.28 No particular form of words or conduct is neces-
sary to the creation of a trust; the essential inquiry is whether the
settlor manifested an intention to impose equitable duties to deal with
the property for the benefit of another.2 9 There is analogous search
for intent in the trust cases and in the third party beneficiary cases. In
the principal case, treating the minors as the "cestui qui trust", they
could bring suit in equity joining the trustee (mother) and the prom-
isor (father) as codefendants and settle the matter in one action.3 0
Such an application of the trust device might well have avoided the
thwarting of intention and yielded protection to the minor children.
In the principal case, the problem of rescission was but mentioned
in passing since the court treated the children as barred from suit. Had
the result been otherwise, what effect would the refusal of the mother
to accept further payments have had on the children's right to recover?
The weight of authority allows parties entering a contract for the bene-
fit of a third person to rescind or vary the contract as they see fit
without the assent of the third person at any time before he acts in
person is merely a matter of arrangement of convenience for the other -party to the
contract, or whether the primary purpose and object of the promise are to
benefit the third person; ...while, therefore both the promisee and the third
person no doubt receive some benefit in every such contract, the determining ques-
tion is whose interest and benefit are primarily subserved and as a matter of
paramount purpose."
"' See Percival v. Luce, 114 F. (2d) 774, 776 (C. C. A. 9th, 1940).
"8 Corwin, Contracts for the Benefit of Third Parties (1918) 27 YALE L. J.
1008.
21 1 ScoTt, THE LAW OF TRUSTS (1939) §§23, 24; 1 RESTATENENT, TRUSTS
(1935) §§23, 24; see Stephens v. Clark, 211 N. C. 84, 88, 189 S. E. 191, 194
(1937).
" Grant v. Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co., 121 U. S. 105, 7 Sup. Ct. 841, 30
L. ed. 905 (1887) : Mason v. Mason, 33 Ga. 435, 83 Am. Dec. 172 (1863); Noll v.
Smith, 250 App. Div. 453, 294 N. Y. S. 562 (1937); Gandy v. Gandy, 30 Ch. D.
57 (1885) (promise by husband to pay trustee money for support of promisor's
wife and children, held, enforceable by wife when trustee refused to sue) ; ScOTT,
op. cit. supra note 30, §282.1; WLLISTox, op. cit. supra note 3, §355.
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reliance on the contract.31 A minority holds that once the contract is
made, rights of the third person vest and may not be changed thereafter
without his assent.82 Some courts draw a distinction where the bene-
ficiary is an infant and require no formal or express acceptance on his
part in order for his rights to vest.83 After action in reliance on the
contract by a third party beneficiary, the original parties may not, with-
out his consent, rescind the contract in such a way as to deprive him
of its benefits.3 4 Had the minors been classified as direct beneficiaries
in the principal case, their assent might have been presumed so that the
mother's refusal to accept further payments would have been no bar
to recovery; not being their legal guardian, the mother could not con-
sent to a release for them.
JOHN HENRY BLALOCK.
Courts-Alimony-Power of Court to Modify Prior Award.
H and W were divorced a vinculo in 1929 and the decree awarded
W $50 monthly alimony. The court refused I's motion that the power
to modify be reserved, and on appeal this was sustained by the Supreme
Court of Virginia.1 In 1938 the Virginia Legislature amended the ali-
mony statute to allow modification of any alimony award, whether past
or future.2 H sought to modify the 1929 decree, and W defended that
the 1938 amendment was unconstitutional insofar as it applied retro-
spectively. Held, although the court lacked power to modify the decree
"
1 Clark v. Nelson, 211 Ala. 199, 112 So. 819 (1927); Jordan v. Laventy,
53 N. J. Eq. 15, 20 At. 832 (1890) (partnership agreement, making, promisor
liable for one half of debts, rescinded by promisor before acceptance.by creditor,
held, good defense); Trinble v. Strother, 25 Ohio St. 378 (1874) (D agreed
with another to pay a debt to P, but they rescinded before P acted on the promise,
held, good defense) ; Blake v. Atlantic Nat. Bank, 33 R. I. 464, 82 Atl. 225 (1912).
" Tweeddale v. Tweeddale, 116 Wis. 517, 93 N. W. 440 (1903), cited supra
note 14; see Bay v. Williams, 112 I1. 91, 96, 1 N. E. 340, 342 (1884) (saying
third party's rights, came into being at time contract was made and could not be
rescinded without his consent).
38 Waterman v. Morgan, 114 Ind. 237, 16 N. E. 590 (1880) (in consideration of
father conveying land to him, son agrees to pay certain money to father's minor
grandchildren, held, enforceable by minors as acceptance was presumed) ; Brill v.
Brill, 282 Pa. 276, 127 Ad. 840 (1925) (release by mother not binding on infant).
., Richardson v. Short, 201 Iowa 561, 202 N. W. 836 (1925); Dodge v. Moss,
82 Ky. 441 (1884) (where sale of land would satisfy debt to a third person
vendor and vendee could not agree to annul their agreement after his accep-
tande) ; Thomas v. Atkinson, 94 S. C. 125, 77 S. E. 722 (1913) (holding that
where a party to contract notified beneficiary of the transaction, the original
parties may not thereafter rescind, since acceptance is implied and certain rights
pass to the beneficiary) ; Estscheid v. Baker, 112 Wis. 129, 88 N. W. 52 (1901)(where third person had notice of and assented to contract .whereby a gift of
$1,000 was to be made -him on the happening of certain contingency, his rights
were notl divested by mutual rescission by immediate parties).
'Eaton v. Davis, 154 Va. xxi (1930) (Memorandum).
2 VA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1938 Supp.) §5111.
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prior to the 1938 amendment, it now had that power, the amendment
being constitutional."
Forty of the fifty-one American jurisdictions have statutes allowing
modification of alimony decrees in particular situations, 4 but there is
much conflict as to whether a court has power to modify in the absence
of such a statute or of a reservation of such power in the decree. This
question necessarily turns upon the history of divorce and alimony, the
statutory provisions therefor, and the distinction between divorces a
mensa et thoro and a vinculo.
Under the common law of England, the ecclesiastical courts granted
only divorces a nensa et thoro, and maintained a continuing jurisdiction
over any award of alimony without reserving such power in the decree.5
It was said that alimony in a divorce a mensa merely represented a
continuation of the husband's duty to support his wife during cover-
ture, and that there was no release from this duty by a divorce which
did not finally sever the marital relation. This part of the common law
has been adopted in the United States, and today it is practically the
undisputed rule that alimony awarded with a divorce a mnensa is subject
to modification from time to time without any reservation of that power
in the decree and without any statutory authorization.6
North Carolina statutes specifically allow modification of alimony
decreed pendente lite and without divorce,8 and the common law power
of modification in the case of a divorce a mensa is recognized by our
courts. 9
There is a sharp disagreement, in the absence of statute or reserva-
tion, as to whether a court may modify an alimony award granted with
'Eaton v. Davis, 10 S.E. (2d) 893 (Va. 1940).
'2 VniERI, AmERicAN FAMILY LAWS (1932) §106; VmmRan, AmElCAN
FAMILY LAWS (1938 Supp.) §106.
Alimony is "the allowance made to a wife out of her husband's estate for
support, either during a matrimonial suit, or at its termination, when she proves
herself entitled to a separate maintenance ... " BLAcx, LAW Dicr. (1933).
References to "alimony" throughout this note include an award made in favor
of the wife only. An award for the support of children is beyond the scope
of this note, as is an award based upon a contractual relation between husband
and wife. Likewise, accrued alimony is not considered here.
'ADDEN, DOMESTIC RE.ATioxs (1931) 328; Vernier and Harlbut, The His-
torical Background of Alimony and Its Present Statutory Structure, (1939)6 LAW AND CONTEMP. PRoB. 197, 198; See Gloth v. Gloth, 154 Va. 511, 534,
153 S.E. 879, 886 (1930).
'Rogers v. Vines, 28 N. C. 293 (1846); Taylor v. Taylor, 93 N. C. 418(1885); Crews v. Crews, 175 N. C. 168, 95 S. E. 149 (1918); Gloth v. Gloth,
154 Va. 511, 153' S. E. 879 (1930); Ruge v. Ruge, 97 Wash. 51, 165 Pac. 1063(1917); MADDEN, D mESTIC RELATIONs (1931) 328; 2 SCHOULER, MARRIAGE,
DIvoacE, SEPARATION AND DoMxESTIc RELATIONS (6th ed. 1921) 1991; Note (1913)
26 HARV. L. R. 441. See collection of cases in Notes (1931) 71 A. L. R. 723,
724, (1940) 127 A. L. R. 741, 742.
"N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §1666.
'N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939)' §1667.
' See N. C. cases cited Note 6, supra.
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an a vinculo divorce. The weight of authority seems to deny that
power.10 These decisions reason that with an a vinculo divorce the
marriage relation reaches complete termination, that an accompanying
decree of alimony is likewise conclusive, and that res adjudicata con-
trols." Conversely, some courts contend that an award of periodical
payments requires supervision by the court, and that jurisdiction is
necessarily retained to permit consideration of changed conditions in
order to insure justice as between the parties.12 Some rationalize that
as divorces a vinculo are entirely statutory, all the elements thereof must
depend upon statute; accordingly if no statute provides for modifica-
tion of alimony, there can be none.' 3 A few differentiate between ali-
mony avowedly designed for support of the wife and alimony in the
form of an ultimate property settlement, allowing modification in the
former case but refusing it in the latter.14 In these cases it is said that
the duty to support may vary with the circumstances of the parties,
but that a property settlement, once made, is as absolute and final as the
divorce itself. These distinctions are of no consequence in North Caro-
lina, for alimony, as such, is not authorized and is never granted with
a divorce a vinculo.15
Recognition of alimony as a continuation of the duty to support
the wife, even after a divorce a vinculo, is found in those -decisions
which hold it not a debt within the constitutional ban against imprison-
ment for debt. 16 The conflict of laws authorities are divided as to
whether an alimony award must be given full faith and credit in other
states.17 Those who say no are troubled by its adjustability.' 8  Simi-
10Livingston v. Livingston, 173 N. Y. 377, 66 N. E. 123 (1903); IEEzER,
MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE (2nd ed. 1923) §765; SCHOULER, Op. cit., supra note 6, at
1991. See collection of cases in Notes L. R. A. 1917 F, 729, (1940) 127 A. L. R.
741, 742.
"lBates v. Bodie, 245 U. S. 520, 62 L. ed. 444, 38 Sup. Ct. 182 (1917);
Graham v. Graham, 135 Neb. 761, 284 N. W. 280 (1939); Livingston v. Living-
ston, 173 N. Y. 377, 66 N. E. 123 (1903); Sampson v. Sampson, 16 R. I. 456,
16 Atl. 711 (1899); Golderos v. Golderos, 169 Va. 496, 194 S. E. 706 (1938);
Ruge v. Ruge, 97 Wash. 51, 165 Pac. 1063 (1917); SCHOUL.R, op. Cit., supra
note 6, at 1991. Note (1913) 26 HARV. L. R. 441. See collection of cases in
Note (1931) 71 A. L. R. 723, 734.12 Epps v. Epps, 218 Ala. 667, 120 So. 150 (1929); Alexander v. Alexander,
13 App. D. C. 334 (1898) ; Emerson v. Emerson, 120 Md. 584, 87 Atl. 1033 (1913) ;
Knabe v. Knabe, 176 Md. 606, 6 Ati. (2d) 366 (1939). See collection of cases
in Note (1931) 71 A. L. R. 723, 738.
1 "Herrick v, Herrick, 319 Ill. 146, 149 N. E. 820 (1925); Mayer v. Mayer,
154 Mich. 386, 117 N. W. 890 (1908) ; Livingston v. Livingston, 173 N. Y. 377, 66
N. E. 123 (1903). See collection of cases in Note (1931) 71 A. L. R. 723, 728.
1 Smith v. Smith, 45 Ala. 264 (1871); Fries v.'Fries, 1 MacArthur 291
(D. C. 1874); Sammis v. Medbury, 14 R. I. 214 (1883).
10 N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §1663; Duffy v. Duffy, 120 N. C. 346,
27 S. F_. 28 (1897) ; Hobbs v. Hobbs, 218 N. C. 468, 11 S. E. (2d) 311 (1940);
1 MORDECAI, LAW LECTURES (2nd ed. 1916) 12.
1 "See collection of cases in Note (1924) 30 A. L. R. 130, 131.
"
7 Compare BEALE, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1935) §435.2 with GOODRICH, CoN-
FLiCT OF LAWS (2nd ed. 1938) §135; Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U. S. 1, 54 L. ed. 905,
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larly, the analogous permanent injunction against tort may be modified
or vacated, without reservation or statutory authority; where changed
circumstances equitably require it.19
In the principal case the statute authorizing modification was held
constitutional both as to its prospective and retrospective application.
The former is universally conceded, but there is a clear split of au-
thority as to whether a statute may operate upon decrees rendered prior
to its enactment. A majority insists that such application is unconsti-
tutional, since an award of alimony is a vested right within the protec-
tion of the 14th Amendment.2 0  Contrarily, the minority insists that
alimony is inherently a continuing obligation of support, subject to the
control and regulation of the court regardless of statute.21
The instant decision seems commendable in its constitutional aspects,
but unduly restrictive in its denial of the court's power to modify ali-
mony in an a vinculo divorce in the absence of statute. The desirability
of finality in litigation should yield to the social need for adjustability
in alimony cases.
P. DALTON KENNEDY, JR.
Criminal Law-Statutes Compelling Attendance
of Out-of-State Witnesses.
In a recent case," an attempt was made by the Attorney General of
New York to have sent to that state certain residents of Pennsylvania
who were certified to be material witnesses in a Grand Jury investiga-
tion. It was expressly stated that no criminal charge was contemplated
against either of the witnesses-their testimony being desired simply
because of their knowledge, as accountant and bookkeeper, of the books
of a Philadelphia firm believed to have been involved in collusive
bidding for public work in New York. This attempt raises a problem
as current as today, and yet as old as our Constitution: When a criminal
proceeding, either grand jury hearing or actual trial, is being conducted
30 Sup. Ct. 682 (1910); Notes (1910) 28 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1068, (1926) 41
A. L. R. 1419, (1928). 57 A. L. R. 1113.18 BEALE, Ioc. cit. supra note 17. See Sistare v.' Sistare, 218 U. S. 1, 17, 54
L. ed. 905, 911, 30 Sup. Ct. 682, 686 (1910).1 4 RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1939) §943, comment (e); See collection of cases
in Note (1930) 68 A. L. R. 1180.
"o Craig v. Craig, 163 Ill. 176, 45 N. E. 153 (1896) ; Livingston v. Livingston,
173 N. Y. 377, 66 N. E. 123 (1903) ; Fuller v. Fuller, 49 R. I. 45, 139 Atl. 662
(1927) ; Blethen v. Blethen, 177 Wash. 431, 32 P. (2d) 543 (1934) ; see Walker
v. Walker, 155 N. Y. 77, 49 N. E. 663 (1898).
2 Hartigan v. Hartigan, 142 Minn. 274, 171 N. W. 925 (1919); Plankers v.
Plankers, 178 Minn. 31, 225 N. W. 913 (1929); Note (1936) 20 MINN. L. R.
314.
'In re People of New York, Court of Quarter Sessions, County of Philadel-
phia. Opinion rendered December 6, 1940.
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in State A., how may the prosecution obtain material evidence solely
within, the knowledge of persons who are either citizens and residents
of State B. or who have fled there to avoid testifying?
The Federal Constitution provides that "In all criminal prosecu-
tions the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the
witnesses against him. .... 2 True, this provision does not apply to
the states; but similar clauses are to be found in most or all of the
state constitutions.3 The primary object of this provision is to secure
to the accused the right of cross-examination of witnesses against
him. 4  Thus depositions taken in thd foreign domicile-state of the wit-
ness would be useless unless, by some means, the accused is given an
opportunity to exercise his right. Since it is generally provided by
statute that the accused may take depositions within or without the
state for use in his defense, this constitutional provision secures for
him an advantage over the prosecution. 5 Unless the accused is willing
to waive his right, the prosecution must actually place its witnesses
before him.
Lack of machinery for obtaining witnesses from a sister state has
made the state line a most effective barrier to the administration of
justice. Extradition procedure provided by the Federal Constitution
and by statutes has succeeded admirably well in preventing the criminal
himself from escaping the jurisdiction in which the crime was perpe-
trated; however, criminals were quick to learn that prosecution could
be just as effectively prevented by spiriting away, through bribery or
intimidation, the material witnesses in their cases. Furthermore, crime,
like many present-day problems, often has left state boundaries behind
U. S. CoNsT. 6TH AMENDMENT.
3 See 5 WIGMORE EVIDENCE (3rd ed. 1940) §1397, n. 1, wherein the provisions
are set forth.
' Mattox v. United States, 156 U. S. 237, 15 Sup. Ct. 337, 39 L. ed. 409 (1894).
The right to confrontation secures the right of cross-examination. That right,
in turn, in the final analysis, guarantees enforcement of the hearsay rule, and is
subject to the same exceptions as is that rule. 5 WIGMORE, EvIDENCE (3rd ed.
1940) §1397. Thus, dying declarations of witnesses for the prosecution could
undoubtedly be used. Moreover, it now seems well settled that depositions may
be used by the state in criminal trials if the witness himself is not available and
it appears that, in the taking of the testimony, the accused was confronted with
the witness and given a proper opportunity to cross-examine, provided it is shown
to the satisfaction of the court that the witness is dead, insane, too ill ever to
be expected to attend the trial, or a non-resident permanently beyond the juris-
diction of the court. West v. Louisiana, 194 U. S. 258, 24 Sup. Ct. 650, 48 L. ed.
965 (1904). It is arguable that the right of confrontation must be kept inviolate
because of its secondary advantage of presenting to the judge and jury the de-
portment of the testifying witness. However, the rule is said to be that this
secondary advantage is to be insisted upon only where it can be had-The right
to be confronted is a personal privilege which the accused may waive. Diaz v.
United States, 223 U. S. 442, 32 Sup. Ct. 250, 56 L. ed. 500 (1912); State v.
Mitchell, 119 N. C. 784, 25 S. E. 783 (1896).
rThis situation was reported to the American Law Institute as a defect in
criminal justice. See REPORT OV THE COMMITTEE ON A SURVEY AND STATEMENT
OF THE DEFECTS IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1925) 23.
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and become national in scope. Frequently material witnesses, who have
never been in the forum state, simply refuse voluntarily to neglect their
business and inconvenience themselves out of a mere sense of public
justice. Desiring more stringent enforcement of their criminal laws,
states have long sought methods for preventing a material witness for the
prosecution in one state from placing himself beyond their process by
simply remaining in or fleeing to another state.6 The methods of
solution which have been attempted may be grouped as follows:. (1) The
early laws of certain New England states; (2) the New York law of
1902; (3) the Wisconsin law- providing machinery for sending accused
to domicile of the prosecuting witness; (4) the Federal Fugitive Felon
law; (5) the Act to Secure the Attendance of Witnesses from Without
a State in Criminal Proceedings, 7 as proposed by the Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws.
As early as 1792, the state of New Hampshire provided by statutes
that upon certification by the clerk of "any court of any other of the
United States," that a named resident of New Hampshire is a material
witness in a criminal case therein pending, a justice of the peace may
issue a summons requiring such person to attend trial in the requesting
state; and that if the proposed witness, after having been tendered
certain expense moneys, should "unreasonably neglect or refuse to attend
and testify," a certain money penalty should be imposed. Similar
statutes were subsequently passed in all of the New England states,9
varying in detail as to limitations upon where witness could be sent,'0
and as to the extent of and to whom the penalty should be paid. How-
ever, these early statutes were alike in giving the witness no hearing be-
fore ordering him to proceed to the requesting state, in containing no
provisions protecting the witness from process while traveling or in the
requesting state, in providing only for sending and not for requesting
witnesses, and in imposing only a fine as punishment for failure to obey
the order. The constitutionality of these acts seems doubtful; however,
it is said that their validity was never passed on by a court of last resort,
and that in practice they were satisfactory."
Forerunner of the Uniform Act was the statute adopted in New
York in 1902.12 Limited irq its application to border states, to crimes
Generally, on this problem, see Note (1937) 85 U. oF PA. L. R. 717.
Hereinafter called the "Uniform Act."
'N. H. LAWS 1792, pp. 251-252.
'Coir. Acts 1903, c. 87; ME, LAWS 1855, c. 184; MAss. LAws 1873, c, 319;
R. I. LAWS 1907, c. 1462; VT. Acts 1878, no. 43, p. 51.
" Conn. and Vt., like N. H., placed no limitation thereon; but R. I. specified
only the New England States, and Mass. limited the privilege t6 adjoining states
and Maine.
11 See Harker, Comptdsory Attendance of Non-Resident Witnesses in Criminal
Cases (1928) 33 Iu. L. REv. 195, 198; Note (1902) 6 LAw Noms 159. All
states in this group have, since 1936, adopted the Uniform Act.2 LAWS OF NEw YoRx 1902, c. 94. The second draft of the Uniform Act,
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of the grade of a felony, and to pending actions, the New York act
was the first requiring reciprocal legislation. It also required laws in
the requesting state for the protection of witnesses from service of
papers and arrest. One of its great advantages over the earlier acts
was that this act gave the proposed witness opportunity to appear and
be heard in opposition to the request, thus being less succeptible to
attack as a deprivation of liberty without due process of law. The
New York court, after determining the materiality and necessity of the
person as witness, ordered him to appear and testify in the requesting
state. This statute gave the court much greater power to compel the
witness to act, because disobedience of the order placed a proposed
witness in contempt of court and empowered the official to imprison
him,, rather than simply to fine him as was provided in the earlier laws.' 3
In spite of its improvements, this act was but a step toward the solution
of the problem, its practical defects being apparent because of its limi-
tations.
Proceeding on the theory that it could not force a non-resident
witness to come into the forum, and yet being unable to disregard the
accused's right to cross-examine witnesses against him, Wisconsin has
gone so far as to empower the prosecution to take the accused to the
non-resident witness so that a deposition for the prosecution taken there
could be used on trial.14 The Wisconsin statute provides that if the
accused is in custody, he is to be taken to the residence of the wit-
ness by officers of the state-this right on behalf of the state is not
to be granted unless all states through which the officer will travel
with the accused have conferred upon the officers of Wisconsin the
right to hold and convey prisoners in and through them. If the
accused is not in custody, he is ordered to attend, and having been
tendered witness fees, if he does not appear, he is deemed to have
waived his right of confrontation as to the particular deposition taken.
The machinery established in this earnest effort to combat crime has its
advantages. It is far better than no procedure at all for obtaining such
testimony. However, it seems cumbersome and inferior to the Uni-
form Act.' 5
approved by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1928, was essentially
a restatement of this act of New York. See HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL
CONFERENCE Or COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS (1928) 430-433.
"' For an excellent discussion of all phases of this New York Act, see Medalie,
Inter-State Exchange of Witnesses in Criminal Cases (1929) 33 LAW NOTES 166.
This 'act was held unconstitutional in 1904; but in; 1911 the New York court
reversed its view and declared the act constitutional. See Notes 25 and 26,
infra. New York adopted the Uniform Act, in complete form, in 1936.
"" WIsc. STATs. 1939, §326.06. See State v. Shaughnessy, 212 Wis. 322, 249
N. W. 522 (1933) in which the provision was utilized.
"5 Some questions which might arise from the use of this statute are: What
right does the Wisconsin court have to order a man, presumed to be innocent
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The Federal Fugitive Felon Law16 was passed in 1934 because of
the absence of suitable legislation among the states providing for the
rendition of fugitive witnesses. That Act made it a felony to travel in
interstate or foreign commerce "with intent . . . to avoid giving testi-
mony in any criminal proceedings in such place in which the commission
of a felony is charged." The objects of this law have been said to
"balance the equities between the accuser and accused . . . and...
restrain the flight of witnesses from the performance of their most
sacred duty as citizens .... u17 It is said to be only a "temporary expe-
dient to be used until such time as the states, by compact or uniform
law, shall provide for the return of witnesses who have left the trial
jurisdiction."'' 8 Although this statute, by making .the specified act
criminal under the federal laws, undoubtedly is beneficial,19 it falls
far short of solving the problem., It is limited in application, to witnesses
to felonies who have fled across state lines. The threat of committing
a federal crime is its only coercive force-no machinery is provided for
turning the witness over to testify in the criminal proceeding from
which he fled.
The Uniform Act to Secure the Attendance of Witnesses from
Without a State in Criminal Proceedings, 20 the culmination of twenty
years consideration by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws, combines the better features of all former legis-
lation on this subject. Reciprocal in nature, the machinery set up is
actuated when a court of record in State A. certifies that there is a
"criminal proceeding pending in such court, or that a grand jury inves-
tigation has commenced or is about to commence," wherein X., within
the boundaries of State B., is needed as a material witness. Upon-receipt
of such certificate by a court of record in X.'s county, an order is
until proved guilty, to go into another state in order to preserve his constitutional
right? What power do the Wisconsin officers have over the accused after they
leave the jurisdiction of their courts? What rights would they have if the
accused escaped while they were in another state? Supposing that the accused
had bribed the witness to avoid testifying, could the Wisconsin court force the
witness to appear and testify so as to form -a deposition? It seems that this
statute provides a greater violation of the old rule that courts may not order
performance of acts beyond their jurisdictional boundaries than does the Uni-
form Act; however, see note 31, infra, for new, liberal trend.1048 STAT. 782 (1934), 18 U. S. C. A §408e (Supp. 1940).
x" Toy and Shepherd, The Problem of Fugitive Felons and Witnesses (1934)
1 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 415, 422.
" Address by Gordon Dean, Attache of Dep't. of Justice, PROCEEDINGS OF
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S CONFERENCE ON CRIME (1934) 67-68.
" The three cases which have passed upon this statute seem to have settled its
constitutionality. ". . . the withdrawal by Congress of the facilities of inter-
state commerce from . . . criminals is an appropriate means to a proper end,
and the most effective way to prevent the use of interstate commerce to defeat
justice." Simmons v. Zerbst, 18 F. Supp. 929, 930 (D. C. Ga. 1937) ; Barrow v.
Owen, 89 F. (2d) 476 (C. C. A. 5th, 1937); United States v. Miller, 17 F.
Supp. 65 (D. C. Ky. 1936). " 9 U. L. A. (Supp. 1940) 9.
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issued commanding him to appear for a hearing. If, at the hear-
ing, it is determined (1) that X. is a "material and necessary"
witness, (2) that no "undue hardship" is involved in the trip,21 and
(3) that State A. and all other states through which X. will be required
to pass have granted him protection from arrest and service of process
while traveling and attending, the court of State B. may issue a sum-
mons commanding X. to attend and testify in the requesting state. It is
further provided that if the said certificate so recommends, the judge in
State B. may order that the witness be bodily delivered over to officers
of State A. However, before this latter procedure is used, the essential
requisites must be found at the hearing, and it must be deemed necessary
and expedient that the proposed witness be delivered to the officers
instead of being allowed to attend voluntarily. If, under the first
method, after being ordered and tendered a specified sum, 22 X. fails to
attend in State A.; "he shall be punished in the manner provided for
the punishment of any witness who disobeys a summons issued from a
court of record" in State B.23 Under the Uniform Act, in order to
facilitate the above procedure, each state guarantees protection from
arrest or service of process to any person attending court on its request
or passing through the state in obedience to a like summons. Many
drafts have been submitted by the Commissioners, each of which has
been adopted by some states. The final draft was much more complete
than its predecessors. Of the 33 states having legislation on this
subject,24 23 have acts adopted during or after 1936, which is the
date of submission of the final complete draft to the states.
"1 The earlier drafts, adopted by many states, limited application of the Act to
1,000 miles by the ordinary traveled route, though such a limitation was con-
sidered arbitrary and unnecessary by many of the drafters of the Act. See
HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE
LAWs (1931) 44 et seq., 421 et seq. The 1,000 mile limitation seems to have
been the result of a compromise with the American Law Institute, whose original
draft on this subject limited application of the process to border states. See
MODEL CODE OF CRdr. PRoc., Final Draft, §§320, 321. The limit was omitted
in the final draft as approved by the Commissioners in 1936. HAND1OOK OF THE
NATIONAL CONFERENCE_ OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS (1936)
333-338. The matter of imposing a limitation being left to the discretion of the
adopting state, the majority of states have omitted the limitation.
"
2Ten cents for each mile by the ordinary traveled route to and from the
court where the prosecution is pending and five dollars for each day that he is
required to travel and attend is the usual amount, although some statu have
reduced the rate per mile slightly.
28 It may be -noted that if X., in compliance with the subpoena, went into State
A., and then failed to attend the proceedings as ordered, the Commissioners who
drafted the Uniform Act were of the opinion that the requesting court in State A.
would have the power to punish him for contempt. See HANDBOOK OF THE
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS (1936)
156, (1931) 64-69.
" See 9 U. L. A. 9 listing statutes of the following states -wherein Act has
been adopted: (The starred states have acts adopted during or after 1936):
Arizona,* Arkansas, California,* Colorado,* Connecticut,* Delaware,* Idaho,
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The New York statute of 1902 was first declared unconstitutional
in a decision which was admittedly hurried and rendered without re-
search.25 This opinion was overruled by Massachusetts v. Klaus2 6-a
decision by a five-to-four divided court, containing an excellent dis-
cussion of the points involved in this problem. Therein, the majority held
the act constitutional, saying that due process was amply provided, free-
dom of ingress and egress was not unduly hampered, and, since there
was great need for this procedure, it should be presumed valid unless
found to be in contravention of some constitutional provision. Justice
Laughlin, dissenting, argued that the proposed witness was deprived of
due process since the court was attempting to act where it had no power,
freedom of ingress and egress was directly impaired, and that this act
was an attempt to make inter-state agreements without the consent of
Congress. 27
The case mentioned at the outset was presented to an inferior
court of Pennsylvania, which state had adopted the Uniform Act.
That court accepted almost without change the dissent of Justice
Laughlin in Massachusetts v. Klaus, a decision under the New York
Law of 1902. Requested subpoenaes were refused on the ground
that the Uniform Act was unconstitutional. 2
It was held that sending a proposed witness to another state under
Indiana, Maine,* Marylatid,* Massachusetts,* Minnesota, Mississippi,* Montana,*
Nebraska,* Nevada, New Hampshire,* New Jersey, New York,* North Carolina,*
North Dakota, Ohio,* Oregon,* Pennsylvania, 'Rhode Island,* South Dakota,*
Tennessee,* Utah,* Vermont,* Virginia,* West Virginia,* Wisconsin, Wyoming.
" In re Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 45 Misc. 46, 90 N. Y. Supp. 808
(Sup. Ct., 1904).
" 145 App. Div. 798, 130 N. Y. Supp. 713 (1st Dep't 1911).
"Justice Laughlin, in his dissent, urges that the act, being reciprocal in
nature, is an attempt to make an unsigned treaty or compact with other states,
and, as such, is violative of Article I, Sec. 10, Sub-sec. 1-2 of the Federal Constitu-
tion when done without the consent of Congress. This argument might have been
of some validity in 1911, but it is now of no effect. In 1934, Congress gave its
consent to any inter-state agreement leading toward "cooperative effort and mutual
assistance in the prevention of crime and in the enforcement of their respective
criminal laws." 48 STAr. 909 (1934), 18 U. S. C. A. §420 (Supp. 1940).
J2t re People of New York, Court of Quarter Sessions, County of Phila-
delphia. Opinion rendered December ,6, 1940. This was the first decision actually
to pass on the merits of the Uniform Act. In People of New York v. Parker,
1 Atl. (2d) 54 (N. J. Circ. Ct., 1936), the act.was declared invalid on the sole
ground that its title, "Uniform Act to Secure the Attendance of Witnesses from
Without the State . . ." did not reasonably import that citizens of New Jersey
might be called on thereby to go to some other state. This reasoning was. also
used by the Pennsylvania court in the principal case as a minor ground for
declaring the act invalid. It seems that the natural import of the term "Uniform
Act" in the title should inform citizens of the reciprocal nature of the act.
However, it might be well, in order to avoid difficulty on this point, to change
the title of the Act, in states which like North Carolina have such a form, to
read ". . . from within or without a state. . . ." A title of that style was
adopted by the Interstate Commission on Crime when they placed their approval
on the Uniform Act. See HAIDBOOK ON INTERSTATE CRIME CONTRoL (Executive
Officers of the Commission, Newark, N. J., 1940) 39-49.
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the Uniform Act would be a deprivation of liberty without due process
of law. "The mere fact that the formality of appearing before a judge
is required does not materially change the situation. . . . Due process
requires not only notice and hearing . . . but that the adjudication
should be by a court of competent jurisdiction, and that the process of
a court can have no extraterritorial effect."29 However, the better view
seems to be that this Act provides due process in every real sense of
the word. Under the Act, the proposed witness is afforded greater due
process of law than is a citizen who is summoned as witness in his own
state.2 0 He "must be given notice and an opportunity to be heard before
a subpoena can be issued, and in addition is assured of ample indemnity
for expenses, and immunity from the service of process while in [or
going to or from] the foreign state." It must be found, not only that
he is necessary, but also that no undue hardship is involved. The grow-
ing view among the authorities is that a court may order performance
of affirmative acts beyond its jurisdiction 3 -by so doing, the court aids
2 In re People of New York, typed copy of opinion, p. 13. See also dissenting
opinion in Massachusetts v. Klaus, 145 App. Div. 498, 130 N. Y. Supp. 713,. 719
(1st Dep't 1911).
" In this connection, the principal case presented the view that this Act makes
no. provision for permitting entering a recognizance; that such a practice is
allowed even in extradition proceedings. Such a view seems fallacious, in that
the proposed witness is not taken into custody at all unless there are reasonable
grounds 'for believing that he will disobey the court's order. Furthermore, the
weight of authority seems to be that ordinarily one in custody under an extradition
warrant is not entitled to bail: Hames v. Sturdivant, 181 Ga. 427, 182 S. E. 601
(1935); In re Thompson, 85 N. J. Eq. 221, 96 Atl. 102 (Ch., 1915); State v.
Ronald, 107 Wash. 189, 179 Pac. 843 (1919). Contra: Ex parte Thaw, 209
Fed. 954 (D. C. N. H. 1923).
" Perhaps the leading authority for the view that a court of equity may order
affirmative acts to be done beyond the jurisdiction of the court is The Salton Sea
Cases, 172 Fed. 792 (C. C. A. 9th, 1909), in which the court ordered defendant
to abate a nuisance in California caused by the construction of water intakes in
Mexico, the effect of the order being to force defendant to do affirmative acts
(repair the intakes) in Mexico. In Niagara Falls International Bridge Co. v.
Grand Trunk Ry. of Canada, 241 N. Y. 85, 148 N. E. 797 (1925), it was held
that it was no objection to the decree that it required D: to do affirmative acts
(reconstruct ry. tracks) in Canada. For comments thereon, see: Notes (1925)
35 YALE L. J. 229; (1928) 74 U. OF PA. L. R. 322. In Madden v. Rosseter,
114 Misc. 416, 187 N. Y. Supp. 462 (Sup. Ct., 1921), the New York court ordered
defendant, who was before the court, to ship a horse from California to Ken-
tucky. See for comments thereon: Notes (1921) 30 YALE L. J. 865; (1922)
35 HARv. L. Rxv. 610.
Further bearing out the above trend, and of especial value on the problem
in question are the following provisions of the RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS
(1934) §94: "A state can exercise jurisdiction through its courts to make a
decree directing a party subject to the jurisdiction of the court to do an act in
another state, provided such act is not contrary to the law of the state in which
it is to be performed." §95: "A state can exercise through its courts jurisdiction
to order a party subject to its jurisdiction to institute proceedings in a court
or other governmental agency in another state, or to defend or appear in such
proceedings."
But see Beal, Equity it America (1923) 1 CAmB. L. J. 21, 27, wherein Pro-
fessor Beal criticises the above cases as violating a "settled principle of law that a
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indirectly the administration of justice within its own state as well as
facilitates the administration of justice generally.
Another basis for the present decision was that the Uniform Act
violates "privileges and immunities" under the Federal Constitution,
in that the state impairs freedom of ingress and egress. The act has
the effect of compelling peaceful citizens of a state, against whom no
criminal charge has been made, to leave the state against their wills.
Or, it would result in compelling one to leave the state whom the state
could not legally prevent from entering.32 This view seems amply
refuted by the majority holding in Massachusetts v. Klaus: ". . . the
right of free ingress and egress- was never intended to enable a citizen
of the United States to interfere -with the orderly administration of
justice within ... the state ... the only protection which the privileges
and immunities clause . . . affords him there is that no state shall
discriminate between him and the citizens of the state."3 3 Giving
testimony when one is capable is a long-recognized duty, whose per-
formance society has a right to compel.3 4 Admittedly, the right of
free ingress and egress is subjected to the police power of a state. 35
What right should one have to insist on exercising that freedom for
the sole purpose of escaping a duty placed on him for the good of
society and the orderly administration of justice? There should be
no objection to a temporary interference with this right until such duty
is performed. Whenever a citizen is subpoenaed as a witness, his
freedom of movement is restrained in much the same manner.
Several subterfuges may be attempted if the law in question fails.
A state might pass a law making it a misdemeanor to flee from the
state to avoid giving testimony in a criminal proceeding. A misde-
meanor is an extraditable offense under the federal laws. Thereby,
the proposed witness could be returned to the state, and, while being
tried'for that offense, be subpoenaed to appear in the other proceeding
as witness. Also when a fleeing witness is returned to be tried under
the Federal Fugitive Felon Law, he could easily be turned over to
the state officers for use in the criminal proceeding in which he was
Court of Equity cannot order the doing of an act outside the territory of its
Sovereign."32In re People of New York, typed copy of opinion, pp. 8-12. Dissenting
opinion in Massachusetts v. Klaus, 145 App. Div. 798, 130 N. Y. Supp. 713,
721 (1st Dep't 1911).
'145 App. Div. 798, 130 N. Y. Supp. 713, 717 (lst Dep't 1911).
'8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (3rd ed. 1940) §2192: "For more than three cen-
turies it has now been recognized as a fundamental maxim that the publid . ..
has a right to every man's evidence . . . ,there is a general duty to give what
testimony one is capable of giving . . . the whole life of the community;' the
regularity and continuity of its relations, depend upon the coming of the witness."
" See dissenting opinion in Massachusetts v. Klaus, 145 App. Div. 798, 130
N. Y. Supp. 713, 721 (1st Dep't 1911) and cases cited. BRANNON, ON THE FOUR-
TEENTH AMENDMENT (1901) 176.
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attempting to avoid giving testimony. The difficulty of this latter
suggestion is that it applies only to witnesses to felonies. Both sugges-
tions are defective in that they provide no machinery for obtaining wit-
nesses who have not fled but who are permanent residents of the foreign
state. Furthermore, these ideas are obviously subterfuges. Justice
should not be forced to stoop to such when the practical, smooth-working
system established by the Uniform Act could be so easily upheld.
The desirability of the type of law in question need be no further
reiterated. Suffice it to say that this is one of six fundamental problems
in the administration of the criminal law which have been studied by
the Interstate Commission on Crime.36 Unless this uniform law be
upheld, we will be again thrown into that anomalous situation wherein
a needed witness who has placed a state line between himself and the
court may be "begged to return, or kidnaped and returned, but there
is no legal procedure provided by the states which can compel him to
return unless he, himself, has committed an extraditable offense. 38T
HARvEY A. JONAS, JR.
Federal Jurisdiction-State in rem Action as Bar to Jurisdiction
The federal district court refused to look into the merits of a case
brought by members and officers of the newly united Methodist Church
against dissenters in South Carolina, who oppose the union of the three
separate Methodist Episcopal Church bodies.' The petitioners seek a
declaratory judgment as to the validity of the union and the rights
thereunder, and an injunction against any other group using the title
Methodist Episcopal Church, South.2 After conceding that the action
was proper as to jurisdictional amount, as to diversity of citizenship, as
a class action, and for settlement under the Declaratory Judgment Act,
the court dismissed the action on the grounds that it was an action
in rem, and the res involved had been withdrawn by prior state court
actions.3
" See HANDBOOK ON INTERSTATE CRIME CONTROL (Executive Offices of the
Interstate Commission on Crime, Newark, N. J., 1940) 39-49. Approved forms
for use under the Act are therein set out.
" Address by Gordon Dean, Attache of Dept. of Justice, PROCEEDINGS OF
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S CONFERENCE ON CRIME (1934) 67.
'The unification being contested is the attempted ending of a schism between
the -northern and southern Methodists which dates back beyond Civil War days
and started with the slavery issue.
' Ordinarily law courts will not disturb ecclesiastic disputes, but will leave
their determination to the appropriate church authorities. Here, however, all the
property is centrally and commonly owned, and the individual church properties
are held by trustees for the greater church. Courts will go into ecclesiastic dis-
putes where property rights are involved. Barkley v. Hayes, 208 Fed. 319 (W. D.
Mo. 1913).
'Purcell v. Summers, 34 F. Supp. 421 (E. D. S. C. 1940).
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These prior state actions arose from attempts by several groups
of dissidents to the unification to take possession of local church prop-
erties, by means of alleged wrongful conveyance to new trustees for
the benefit of the individual churches as separate bodies.4 In these
state actions local plaintiffs, on behalf of all those favoring the unifica-
tion, seek to have those deeds declared null and void and the properties
turned over to themselves as the rightful trustees for the unified church,
and they also seek an injunction against the dissenters' use of the
name Methodist Episcopal Church, South, such name now being the
property or right of the union.5 The defense is that the unification
is invalid and accordingly the plaintiffs have no right as against the
dissidents. While the state actions were pending the district court
based its conclusion as to the withdrawal of the res upon the assump-
tion that these property actions in the state court are representative
of all southern churches involved in the unification, and that all proper-
ties affected by the unification will be subject to the South Carolina
decree as to the validity of the union, under the doctrine laid down
in Hartford Life Ins. Co. v. Ibs;6 therefore the South Carolina court
has withd rawn a res including at least all the properties affected within
the state. Since the real controversy7 asserted to support the federal
action is the one present in South Carolina, such a conclusion by the
federal court leaves nothing for its determination.
In view of admissions by the court that this is an otherwise proper
case for determination in a federal court, the jurisdictional issue of
whether the court correctly dismissed this action centers upon the
propriety of applying the following general rule to the facts of this
case: where courts have concurrent jurisdiction, as state and federal
courts may, the first court entertaining an in rem action which necessi-
tates its control of the res will necessarily exclude the other.8
Earliest applications of this rule arose in cases where rival courts
were disputing actual possession of properties under court process-
as to which attached first and whether or not it was exclusive of the
'Eight state actions, now pending, were started by local groups against dis-
senters who tried to alienate the local properties to an independent church styling
itself as the Methodist Episcopal Church, South. Nine others are threatening and
are pointed to by this federal petition. For convenience and because they are
virtually alike they will be grouped together and mentioned as one.
'The injunctions sought in both state and federal actions are requests for
incidental and supplementary relief and will not herein be treated.
'237 U. S. 662, 35 Sup. Ct. 692, 59 L. ed. 1165 (1915).
'There must be a real controversy as distinguished from a dispute of a
hypothetical or abstract character for the court to render a declaratory judgment.
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U. S. 227, 57 Sup. Ct. 461, 81 L. ed. 617,
108 A. L. R. 1000 (1937).
8 Covell v. Heyman, 111 U. S. 176, 4 Sup. Ct. 355, 28 L. ed. 390 (1884);
Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U. S. 226, 43 Sup. Ct. 79, 67 L. ed. 226, 24
A. L. R. 1077 (1922).
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other.9 Some early decisions recognized the difficulty where state and
federal jurisdictions clashed, labeling the situation as lamentable, but
at the same time pleaded ignorance of a method of circumventing the
trouble.1 0  These seemed to say that pendency of another action in a
court of concurrent jurisdiction, even though involving the same parties
and subject matter, was not by any legal precedent excuse for refusing
jurisdiction, despite the fact that final judgments in the two causes
might clash in result. However, the Supreme Court in Freeman v.
Howe1 worked out a method for making federal process exclusive
in cases requiring control of a res. Reasoning that a court first taking
jurisdiction of a cause shall maintain it to the end and litigate all the
questions involved and grant full relief, that exclusive control of the
res is necessary for complete handling of in rem cases, and that no
other court may interfere with a court's process or jurisdiction, the
Supreme Court ruled that "proceedings in rem" must of necessity
exclude other courts in favor of the forum first entered. Buck v.
Colbath12 sought to limit so sweeping a statement by urging that actual
possession and control of the property was the necessity giving rise to
the rule, and therefore when a second action in another court did not
interfere with the control or possession of the res by the first court, the
rule did not apply.' 3 The use of the term "constructive possession" in
that decision' 4 makes the next step in the rule's development natural
enough. The rule was applied to receivership cases, land disputes,
bankruptcies, suits to marshall assets, et cetera.'5 Practically all the
cases where federal courts have refused jurisdiction because of a prior
state action involving the same res have contained the common denomi-
nator of necessary control or possession of the res by the state court
which would be disturbed by the federal court's assuming jurisdiction.
'Taylor v. Carryl, 20 How. 583, 15 L. ed. 1028 (U. S. 1857); Freeman v.
Howe, 24 How. 450, 16 L. ed. 749 (U. S. 1860); Buck v. Colbath, 3 Wall. 334,
18 L. ed. 257 (U. S. 1865). See als6 note, Ann. Cas. 1912A, 150.
" Wadleigh v. Veazie, 28 Fed. Cas. No. 17,031 (Me. 1838) ; Loring v. Marsh,
15 Fed. Cas. No. 8,514 (Mass. 1864).
1124 How. 450, 16 L. ed. 749 (U. S. 1860).
1"3 Wall. 334, 18 L. ed. 257 (U. S. 1865).3 Id. at 342, 18 L. ed. at 260. "It is only while the property is in possession
of the court, either actually or constructively, that the court is bound, or professes
to protect that possession from the process of other courts ......
1 The term "constructive possession" is here used as applied to land or any
other res which can only be possessed constructively. The import of the term is
not meant to detract from the force of the requirement of control or possession.
1" Oakes v. Lake, 290 U. S. 59, 54 Sup. Ct. 13, 78 L. ed. 168 (1933) (receiver-
ship) ; United States v. Bank of New York & Trust Co., 296 U. S. 463, 56 Sup.
Ct. 343, 80 L. ed. 331 (1936) (trust fund ownership); Princess Lida of Thurn
v. Thompson, 305 U. S. 456, 59 Sup. Ct. 275, 83 L. ed. 285 (1939) (accounting
by trustee sought) ; Union Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. University of Chicago, 8 Fed.
443 (C. C. N. D. Ill. 1881) (mortgage foreclosure) ; Sharp v. Bonham, 213 Fed.
660 (M. D. Tenn. 1913) (class action involving church property). See annota-
tions, 5 Roses NOTES ON UNITED STATES REPORTS (1917) 98, 463, 1035; 1 ROSE'S
NoTES ON UNITED STATES REPORTS (1920) 775; 36 Ann. Cas. 1915B, 1118.
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In other words, by the term "in rem action" is meant one looking
toward an actual disposition of a particular res. Federal courts have
not refused to entertain cases involving the litigation of personal lia-
bility10 or of rights concerning property embraced by actions previ-
ously started in state courts, but which were not classed as in rem
actions. 17 If an in personam judgment is rendered by one court it may
then be pleaded as res adjudicata in another court of concurrent juris-
diction where an action involving the same parties still pends.18
In the instant case the conflicting state action is clearly in rem.19
Also there can be no doubt that the issue of the validity of the unifica-
tion is raised in and may be the deciding point of the South Carolina
action; however, the remedy sought in the federal action must be
scrutinized to determine whether or not a full adjudication by the fed-
eral court can be made without interfering with the state court's con-
trol of the particular res, i.e. the local church property in Pine Grove,
South Carolina.
The present petitioners sought a federal court adjudication as to
the validity of the unification and a declaration as to property rights
thereunder. This is distinguishable from Sharp v. Bonham-o in which
federal and state adjudications presented the issue of the validity of a
merger between the Cumberland Presbyterian Church and the Presby-
terian Church in the United States, in the same manner. For there
"Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U. S. 226, 43 Sup. Ct. 79, 67 L. ed. 226,
24 A. L.. R. 1077 (1922) (action for damages for contractual breach relating to
property).
" In Commonwealth Trust Co. v. Bradford, 297 U. S. 613, 56 Sup. Ct. 600, 80
L. ed. 920 (1935), the federal court determined the participation rights of a bank
receiver as cestui que trust of a trust which had been turned over with his con-
sent to a successor trustee appointed by a state court, saying that the action was
not n ren and did not interfere with the trustee's possession or the power of the
state court to order distribution of assets. "Such proceedings are not in. rein; they
seek only to establish rights; judgments therein do not deal with the property or
order distribution; they adjudicate questions which precede distribution." By
Oakes v. Lake, 290 U. S. 59, 54 Sup. Ct. 13, 78 L. ed. 168 (1933), an action
against a sheriff which does not request the property attached but rather asks
damages, is not an action in rein under the exclusive jurisdiction rule because it
does not go to the merits of the in rein case under which the sheriff holds the
res or interfere with the state court's possession of the res. In General Baking
Co. v. Harr, 300 U. S. 433, 57 Sup. Ct. 540, 81 L. ed. 730 (1937), the in rem
label did not apply to litigating the ownership of monies under a trust among the
assets of a bankrupt, and where the state had taken over control of the business
and assets. See also Compton v. Jesup, 68 Fed. 263 (C. C. A. 6th, 1895) ; Hurst
v. Everett, 21 Fed. 218 (C. C. W. D. N. C. 1884); Coe v. Aiken, 50 Fed. 64
(C. C. N. H. 1892).
,'Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U. S. 226, 43 Sup. Ct. 79, 67 L. ed. 226,
24 A. L. R. 1077 (1922).
"9 This state action raises the validity question exactly as it was raised in
Sharp v. Bonham, 213 Fed. 660 (M. D. Tenn. 1913), and the court there called
the action in rein and therefore within the requirement of exclusive jurisdiction.
This statement excludes consideration of the incidental remedy of injunction which
is sought. Injunction suits are generally considered in personam. WALSH, T rAT-
ISE ON EQUIrY (1930) 45. "213 Fed. 660 (M. D. Tenn. 1913).
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different plaintiffs asked in both courts that a certain Grace Church
property be delivered to them as trustees for their respective interests.
Asking that rights be declared as in the instant case and asking that
property be delivered up as in Sharp v. Bonham2l seem materially
different, in that the latter calls for acting on the property itself.
Indeed the instant case lacks the sort of conflict which the in rem
rule of exclusion was intended to obviate. The only possible conflict
here is one of results concerning the validity question. No federal
remedy is asked which might interfere with the complete exercising of
jurisdiction by the South Carolina court. A possible conflict of results
where in personam actions are pursued on the same or similar causes
furnishes no excuse for a federal court denying jurisdiction.22
Whether the nature of declaratory judgments be in personam or sui
generis23 seems unimportant. It is important that they lack the charac-
teristic element of proceedings in rem, in that they contemplate no
direct action on the res; nor do they require control or possession of
a res, although their 'determinations may later form the basis for an
in rem action.24  The federal district court could have gone into the
merits of and decided the instant case without disturbing the South
Carolina court's constructive possession of the Pine Grove church prop-
erties. Therefore by refusing to examine the merits of the instant
case, a justiciable matter properly presented for adjudication, the
federal court apparently exercised a discretion which it did not possess.25
Another factor in this case which does not ring quite true is the
overly-generous evaluation of the effect of the South Carolina litiga-
tion. The fallacy in applying Hartford Ins. Co. v. Ibs" to this case,
as the court did. in its dictum, shows at two points: first, the effect of a
final state judgment deciding issues in class actions which affect prop-
erty and citizens of other states; second, the essential difference in ex-
tent of subject matter in the two actions involved here. All those cases
consciously following Hartford Ins. Co. v. IbsY2 have in common that
21 Ibid.
','Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U. S. 226, 43 Sup. Ct. 79, 67 L. ed. 226
(1922).
"BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS (1934) 138.
2,Id. at 8, 10, 14.
" Wilcox v. Consolidated Gas Co., 212 U. S. 19, 29 Sup. Ct. 192, 53 L. ed.
382 (1909) ; McClellan v. Carland, 217 U. S. 268, 30 Sup. Ct. 501, 54 L. ed. 762(1910); Johnson v. N. Y. D. & W. Ry., 3 F. Supp. 80 (E. D. N. Y. 1931).
28237 U. S. 662, 35 Sup. Ct. 692, 59 L. ed. 1165 (1915).
"'Hartford Life Ins. Co. v. Barber, 245 U. S. 146, 38 Sup. Ct. 54, 62 L. ed.
208 (1917); Christopher v. Brusselback, 302 U. S. 500, 58 Sup. Ct. 350, 82 L. ed.
388 (1938) ; Waybright v. Columbian Mut. Life Ins. Co., 30 F. Supp. 887 (W. D.
Penn. 1939). An earlier case, Smith v. Swormstedt, 16 How. 288, 14 L. ed. 942(U. S. 1853) displayed this characteristic in common with the previously cited
cases. However, some doubt may be cast upon this being the only deciding factor
in view of the decision in Hansberry v. Lee, - U. S. -, 61 Sup. Ct. 115, 85
L. ed. 11 (1940).
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the res (a fund held by the company in the leading case) was com-
pletely within the state whose court's decision' in a clags action was held
binding throughout the nation. The leading case itself spotlights this
feature.28 Repeated litigation concerning the validity of the Presby-
terian Church merger reveals the inconclusiveness of such judgments.29
In several instances the adjudication of one state court was not recog-
nized as res adjudicata in another state;SO one federal decision stated
that no single state decision could establish a rule of property binding
on the federal courts or on other states.3 '
The second point can best be shown by viewing the difference in
parties (despite the language in both actions "and all those similarly
situated") as well as the difference in what is requested in the two
actions. The state action consists wholly of members of the local con-
gregation and is solely a controversy over local church property. The
federal action is brought by bishops asking that the validity of the
union be settled and that the rights of the newly united church be
declared. The latter action is so much broader in its scope, that it is
difficult to conceive how any court could view them as mutually exclu-
sive actions.
Apparently the petitioners in the instant case were trying to pre-
vent a multiplicity of suits and repeated re-litigation of the validity
question such as occurred in the Presbyterian merger controversy. It
must be recognized that this controversy involves thousands of people
and property worth many millions of dollars. So important and urgent
a question should be heard by the most able and impartial of our courts.
A local court rooted in the storm center itself scarcely fills those require-
ments. Federal courts have long been considered preferable in diversity
of citizenship cases because of their comparative freedom from preju-
dice and local pressure. Both legal propriety and practicality would
have been better served had the federal District Court rendered final
judgment on the merits in this case.
GiLBERT C. HINE.
2S . . .it was proper that a class suit should be brought in a court of the
state where the company was chartered and where the mortuary fund was kept"'
237 U. S. 662, 672, 35 Sup. Ct. 692, 695, 59 L. ed. 1165, 1169 (1915).
" See Shepherd v. Barkley, 222 Fed. 669, 670 (C. C. A. 8th, 1915) which
points out the number of courts passing on the validity question in the Presby-
terian controversy. Three cases in the federal courts, at least sixteen cases in at
least eleven state courts passed on it. In addition there were the duplicating
Tennessee actions. Sharp v. Bonham, 213 Fed. 660 (M. D. Tenn. 1913); Bonham
v. Harris, 125 Tenn. 452, 145 S. W. 169 (1911).
"Bonham v. Harris, 125 Tenn. 452, 145 S. W. 169 (1911).
"' See Barkley v. Hayes, 208 Fed. 319, 333 (W. D: Mo. 1913). This stand is
of dubious value today because it was partially based upon Swift v. Tyson, 16
Pet. 1, 10 L. ed. 865 (U. S. 1842) and the general law doctrine which has since
been overruled. Erie R. R. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, 58 Sup. Ct. .817, 82 L. ed.
1188 (1938). 114 A. L. R. 1487.
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Practice and Procedure-Declaratory Judgments
Against Taxes-Suits Against State.
Plaintiff insurance company, alleging a controversy between it and
the Unemployment Compensation Commission over contribution due
the Commission on sums paid by plaintiff to its agents (whom plaintiff
contends are independent contractors), brings this action against the
Commission and its individual officers, under the declaratory judgment
statute, to determine its liability. The trial court sustained the defend-
ant Commission's demurrer ore tenus. On appeal, held, affirmed, on
four grounds: (1) the action is a suit against the state; (2) it is not
covered by the declaratory judgment act; (3) the effect of such a
judgment would amount by indirection to an injunction against the
collection of the contribution or tax, which is expressly prohibited by
the statute setting up the Commission; and (4) the plaintiff has an
adequate statutory, administrative remedy.'
It is not the purpose of this note to take issue with the actual deci-
sion of the principal case, or with the fourth ground relied upon. The
other grounds of the decision, however, may be questioned.
The wisdom of holding the action to be a suit against the state is
doubtful, for the result is that declaratory judgments are thereby pre-
cluded in all controversies with state agencies over liability for taxes.
From the state's point of view, the decision is desirable as it facilitates
the speedy collection of taxes with a minimum of interference. How-
ever, until there has been an express extension to declaratory judgments
of the statutory ban on injunctions,2 the taxpayer may well contend
that it is equally desirable to have an advance determination of the
validity of governmental action, where such is necessary in order to
prevent serious impairment of individual freedom of action. Hence, an
inquiry into whether or not declaratory proceedings are forbidden as
suits against the state may well be worth while.
The general rule that sovereignty renders a state immune to suit
without its consent3 applies as well to such agencies of the state as
commissions and boards.4 The test laid down is whether or not the
state will be directly affected by the judgment, regardless of who are
actually named as parties defendant. 5 The reason for the existence of
this constitutional rule is one of policy-to prevent constant and nu-
lPrudential Ins. Co. of America v. Powell, 217 N. C. 497, 8 S. E. (2d) 619
(1940). 'Cf. notes 22 and 23, infra.
18U. S. CoxsT., 11th Amendment; Rotan v. North Carolina, 195 N. C. 291,
141 S. E. 733 (1928).
'Calkin Dredging Co. v. North Carolina, 191 N. C. 243, 131 S. E. 665 (1926);
Moody v. State Prison, 128 N. C. 12, 38 S. E. 1311 (1901).
rNorth Carolina v. Temple, 134 U. S. 22, 10 Sup. Ct. 509, 33 L. ed. 849
(1890); Carpenter v. Atlanta & Charlotte Air Line Ry., 184 N. C. 400, l1d
S. E. 693 (1922).
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merous interferences with the administration of governmental functions.
However, in practical effect, the rule is by no means iron-clad. The
North Carolina court, in 1907,6 attempted a strict application by hold-
ing that a federal injunction against enforcement of an alleged uncon-
stitutional state statute was a suit against the state and therefore that
state enforcement officers were not prevented from proceeding under
the statute. The United States Supreme Court, however, on the prin-
ciple of Ex parte Young, reversed this decision 7 by releasing on habeas
corpus a person whom the state had jailed for disobeying the statute
involved while following the federal injunction. Using the rationaliza-
tion that since the statute is void, the officer's action under it is an
illegal attempt in the name of the state to enforce the statute, Ex parte
Youn 8 decided that any proceeding against him dtoes not affect the
state in its sovereign capacity. The rule, however, is not confined to
unconstitutional statutes, federal courts having also enjoined the en-
forcement of state statutes wrongfully applied.9 This latter limitation
on the rule preventing suits against the state is by no means peculiar to
federal courts. Numerous state courts have established the same prin-
ciple for the same reason.' 0 'While these injunction cases generally
contain the traditional elements for equitable relief, their presence does
not change the practical effect of the decrees rendered, Whatever the
legalistic explanation, the state in actuality is the real party affected,
because its officers are thereby prevented from carrying out its laws in
the manner attempted. This is true whether the action is to declare a
state statute unconstitutional, or to determine whether or not it right-
fully applies to the particular situation. If an injunction, which is co-
ercive in addition to being a determination of the rights involved, does
not violate the "suit against the state" prohibition, it follows that the
' State v. Southern Railway, 145 N. C. 495, 59 S. E. 570 (1907).
' Hunter v. Wood, 209 U. S. 205, 28 Sup. Ct. 472, 52 L. ed. 747 (1908).
'Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123, 28 Sup, Ct. 441, 52 L. ed. 714 (1907);
Looney v. Crane Co., 245 U. S. 178, 38 Sup. Ct. 85, 62 L. ed. 230 (1917); cf.
Judge John J. Parker in Gramling v. Maxwell, (W. D. N. C. 1931) 52 F. (2d)
256.
, Green v. Louisville & Interurban Ry., 244 U. S. 499, 37 Sup. Ct. 673, 61
L. ed. 1280 (1917); Glenn v. Filled Packing Co., 290 U. S. 177, 54 Sup. Ct.
138, 78 L. ed. 252 (1933); Lee v. Bickell, 292 U. S. 415, 54 Sup. Ct. 727, 78
L. ed. 1336 (1934) ; Beal v. Missouri-Pacific R. R., 108 F. (2d) 897 (C. C. A.
8th, 1940); Modern Woodmen of America v. Casados, 15 F. Supp. 483 (D. N.
M. 1936); cf. Bohler v. Callaway, 267 U. S. 479, 45 Sup. Ct 431, 69 L. ed.
745 (1925).
" Coen v. Lee, 116 Fla. 215, 156 So. 747 (1934) ; Patten- v. Miller, 8 S. E.(2d) 776 (Ga. 1940); People v. Department of Public Welfare, 368 Ill. 505,
14 N. E. (2d) 642 (1938); Conway v. New Hampshire Water Resources Board,
89 N. H. 346, 199 Ad. 83 (1938); cf. Columbia Life Ins. Co. v. Hess, 28 Ohio
App. 107, 162 N. E. 466 (1926), aff'd 116- Ohio St. 416, 156 N. E. 504 (1927);
Purple Truck Garage Co. v. Campbell, 119 Ore. 484, 250 Pac. 213, 51 A. L. R.
816 (1926).
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lesser remedy-a mere declaration of rights by way of declaratory
judgment-is not forbidden. 1
If the "suit against the state" hurdle can be successfully cleared,
the action still must come within the scope of the declaratory judgment
act. The North Carolina act,'2 which is substantially the uniform act,
provides that "any person . . . whose rights, status or other relations
are affected by a statute . . . may have determined any question of
construction or validity arising under the . . . statute . . . and obtain
a declaration of rights, status or other relations thereunder."' 8 Thus,
it seems that the very words of the statute are broad enough to cover
the principal case. However, the court concluded that this provision
referred to declarations concerning questions of law only, and that the
principal case involved purely a question of fact. It is respectfully sub-
mitted that the court is mistaken. The essence of a declaratory judg-
ment action, like any other action, is the determination of a- controversy.
It is certainly more the rule than the exception that disputes as to facts
arise in legal controversies, and the act itself recognizes this by provid-
ing that issues of fac' shall be decided in the same way as in other civil
actions.'4 While it is not possible here to'delve into the fine distinctions
between law and fact, it seems in any event that whether or not an
insurance company's representatives with certain specified duties are
within an unemployment compensation statute is as much a question
of law as of fact.
Three recent decisions, two from Washington' and one from Con-
necticut,' 6 have allowed exactly what was denied in the principal case.
In each of these cases, a declaratory judgment was rendered as to the
status of certain employees under the particular state's unemployment
compensation act. In each, the court apparently conceded the appro-
priateness of a declaratory judgment action, for no question as to suits
against the state was referred to. It is interesting to note that one of
these cases was denominated an action against "the state of Washing-
ton, as a sovereign state. . . . "7 The failure of these courts to discuss
the problem that bothered the North Carolina court is, to say the least,
significant.' 8
" It might be noted that the North Carolina court allowed a declaratoryjudgment to determine the constitutionality of a registration statute for voting,
in Allison v. Sharp, 209 N. C. 477, 184 S. E. 27 (1936).12 N. C. CODE AN. (Michie, 1939) §628 (a)-(o).
"3 N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §628 (b).
1" N. C. CODE AxN. (Michie, 1939) §628 (i).
15 McDermott v. State, 196 Wash. 261, 82 P. (2d) 568 (1938); Washington
Recorder Pub. Co. v. Ernst, 199 Wash. 176, 91 P. (2d) 718 (1939).
" Northwest Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Tone, 125 Conn. 183, 4 Atl. (2d) 640
(1939).
17 McDermott v. State, 196 Wash. 261, 82 P. (2d) 568 (1938).
cf. Taylor v. McSwain, 54 Ariz. 295, 95 P. (2d) 415 (1939).
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The question may properly be asked, why worry about a declaratory
judgment if you can get an injunction? The answer is twofohl. 1. In
addition to North Carolina's general statutory provision prohibiting-
injunctions against taxes,19 the unemployment compensation act spe-
cifically bars injunctions against the contributions in question.20 2. Con-
gress' Johnson Act of 1937 greatly restricts the power of federal courts
to enjoin state taxes.21 True, the principal case holds that the effect of
a declaratory judgment is, by indirection, to enjoin. But it seems that
the rule might well be the opposite. A declaratory judgment merely
determines the actual rights and luties of the government officials. It
exerts no coercive force. That a statutory ban on injunctions against
taxes does not apply to declaratory judgments is shown by the fact that
it took an amendment to the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act to pre-
vent its application to federal taxes,22 notwithstanding the statutory
prohibition against enjoining them. And, while there does not seem to
be unanimity of opinion on the subject, there is at least recent authority
that the Johnson Act does not restrict federal declaratory judgments
as to state taxes.2 3 A mere prohibition against injunctional relief is not
enough, for, in the words of Professor Edwin Borchard, the father of
the declaratory judgment in the United States, "Declaratory relief is
neither legal nor equitable, but sui generis. It has the advantage of
escaping the technicalities associated with equitable and extraordinary
remedies, thus enabling the substantive goal to be reached in the speedi-
est and most inexpensive form. '"2 4
It is submitted that, since the decision of the principal case could
have been reached on the fourth ground alone, the court unnecessarily
confused the law on the other questions considered.2 5
J. B. CHEsHiRE, IV.
'IN. C. Pun. LAws 1939, c. 158, §936; N. C. CODE A x. (Michie, 1939)
§7880 (194). See Perkins, Tax Injunctions and Suits to Recover Taxes Paid
Under Protest it North Carolina (1933) 12 N. C. L. REv. 20.
11 N. C. Pua. LAws 1939, c. 27, §10; N. C. CODE ANIx. (Michie, 1939)
§8052 (14) (e).
2128 U. S. C A. §41 (1) (Supp. 1940).
28 U. S. C. A. §400 (Supp. 1940); See Morrison Knudsen Co. v. State
Board of Equalization of Wyoming, 35 F. Supp. 553 (D. Wyo. 1940).
"Morrison Knudsen Co. v. State Board of Equalization of Wyoming, 35 F.
Supp. 553 (D. Wyo. 1940); But cf. Collier Advertising Service v. City of New
York, 32 F. Supp. 870 (S. D. N. Y. 1940).
" Borchard, The Federal Declaratory Tudgments Act (1934), 21 Va. L. Rev.
35, 38.
2" See generally, Borchard, Declaratory Judgments in Administrative Law(1933) 11 N. Y. U. L. Q. Rev. 139.
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Vendor and Purchaser-Conditional Sale--Vendee's Right to
Vendor's Insurance in Case of Accidental Loss by Fire.
A contracted with B for the purchase of a tract of land for $1,200,
of which $600 was paid in cash. A went into possession and, two
months before title was to pass, was killed in an accidental fire which
destroyed a building on the premises valued at $900. Previously, A had
refused to accept an assignment of the insurance on the building from
his vendor and had also refused to contribute to the premiums on the
policy, asserting that he would claim no interest in any insurance that
B might take out. In the preseni action, A's administrator sued B for
specific performance of the contract of sale and petitioned for applica-
tion of the proceeds of the insurance policy upon the unpaid balance of
the purchase price. The Supreme Court, granting specific performance,
held that the loss occasioned by the fire fell upon the vendee, but refused
to apply the vendor's insurance money upon the purchase price. The
basis of this ruling was that the vendee's disavowal of all interest in
the insurance placed him in the same position as if no insurance had
been maintained and barred any claim that he might make to its
benefits.'
EQUITABLE CONVERSION
As early as 1663 the English court of chancery, invoking the maxim
that equity considers as done that which is agreed to be done, deter-
mined that for certain purposes a contract for the sale of land performs
an equitable conversion, transmuting the vendor's proprietary interests
in real estate into a chose in action, and the vendee's right on the con-
tract into equitable ownership.2 This equitable ownership was recog-
nized to permit the vendee's heirs to succeed to his right of action on
the contract,3 to give the vendee's wife a dower right in the equitable
estate,4 and to allow the vendee to convey his equitable interest in the
I Bruce v. Jennings, 10 S. E. (2d) 56 (Ga. 1940).
'Daire v. Beaversham, 10 Ch. Cas. 39, 21 Eng. Rep. 793 (1663). The
operation of equitable conversion is described by Jessel, M. R., in Lysaght v.
Edwards, L. R. 2 Ch. D. 499, 507 (1876) as follows: "Being a valid contract
it has this remarkable effect, thaf it converts the estate, so to say, in equity;
it makes the purchase money a part of the personal estate of the vendor, and it
makes the land a part of the real estate of the vendee; and therefore all these
cases of constructive conversion are founded simply on this, that a valid contract
actually changes the ownership of the estate in equity." See 1 POMEROY, EQUITY
JURISPRUDENCE (4th ed. 1918) §105; POMEROY, SPEcIFIc PERFORMANCE OF CON-
TRAcTS (3d ed. 1926) §314.
'Bubb's Case, Freem. Ch. 38, 22 Eng. Rep. 1044 (Ch. 1678); Parks v.
Smoots Adm'rs., 105 Ky. 63, 48 S. W. 146 (1898). Conversely upon the
vendor's death, his personal representative secures a chose in action on the con-
tract of sale, "and the legal title is held only as security for the payment of the
debt", Bender v. Luckenback, 162 Pa. 18, 29 Atl. 1063 (1894); cf. Rhodes v.
Meredith, 260 Ill. 138, 102 N. E. 1063 (1913).
"Spalding v. Haley, 101 Ark. 296, 142 S. W. 172 (1911); cf. Nortnass v.
Pioneer Townsite Co., 82 Neb. 382, 117 N. W. 951 (1908).
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land as realty.5 But not until Paine v. Meller,6 in 1801, was the con-
tract of sale considered to make the vendee equitable owner "for all
intents and purposes", and to subject him in equity to the risk of loss
by accidental fire. There, in an action for specific performance, Lord
Eldon held the vendee responsible for the full contract price of a tract
of land although accidental burning of a building on the premises had
reduced its value fifty per cent.
The rule of Paine v. Meller has been adopted in American jurisdic-
tions with but few exceptions. 7 It has provoked considerable criticism,
however, even against the fundamental doctrine of equitable conversion
by contract.8 And its ultimate logical ektension has not yet been reached
' See Paine v. Meller, 6 Ves. 349, 31 Eng. Rep. 1088 (Ch. 1801).
Other purposes for which vendee is considered "owner":(a) Montana statute placed burden of extinguishing fires on him upon whose
property -the fire occurred; vendee held responsible. First National Bank of
Thomas Falls v. United States, 92 F. (2d) 132 (C. C. A. 9th, 1937). See Note
(1938) 36 MIcE. L. REv. 680.(b) Vendee is real party in interest in suit for mesne -profits arising from
trespass occurring after the date of contract. Limberg v. Higginbotham, 11 Colo.
156, 17 Pac. 481 (1888); cf. Mathews v. James Lumber Co., 187 N. C. 651,
122 S. E. 480 (1924) (action for continuing trespass in nature of fire started
before the date of contract); Gartner v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. R., 71 Neb.
444, 98 N. W. 1052 (1904), But see Litchfield v. Norwood Mfg. Co., 22 App.
Div. 569, 48 N. Y. Supp. 496 (3d Dep't 1897).
(c) Where husband and wife entered into contract to purchase land as tenants
b3 entireties and building destroyed pending execution of the contract, wife took
entire equitable estate by survivorship. Roach v. Richardson, 84 Ark. 37, 104
S. W. 538 (1907).
(d) "For the purposes of insurance, the holder of an equitable title . . . may
be said to be vested with the entire, unconditional, and sole ownership.' O'Brien
v. Paulsen, 192 Iowa 1351, 186 N. W. 440 (1922).
'Paine v. Meller, 6 Ves. 349, 31 Eng. Rep. 1088 (Ch. 1801).
"The courts which take exception to the Paine v. Meller doctrine either:
(a) Adopt the rule of law that there is an implied condition in every con-
tract of sale that it shall be void upon material failure of the subject matter;
Anderson v. Yaworski, 181 Atl. 205 (Conn. 1935); Libman v. Levenson, 236
Mass. 221, 128 N. E. 13 (1920) ; Powell -v. Dayton, S. & G. R. R., 120 Ore. 488,
8 Pac. 544 (1885); Appleton Elect. Co. v. Rogers, 200 Wis. 331, 228 N. W.
505 (1930) ; or
(b) Declare that the risk of loss should fall on the party in possession.
La Chance v. Brown, 41 Cal. App. 500, 183 Pac. 216 (1919); cf. In re Boyle's
Estate, 154 Iowa 249, 134 N. W. 590 (1912) ; Bank of Newport v. Reese, 47
R. I. 60, 129 Ati. 803 (1925); Northern Texas Realty Co. v. Lary, 136 S. W.
843 (Tex. Civ. App. 1911); Appleton Electric Co. v. Rogers, 200 Wis. 331,
228 N. W. 505 (1930). See notes (1930) 14 MARQ. L. REv. 183, (1930) 5 Wis.
L. REv. 503, See note 18, infra.
8 At least four views have been advanced by renowned commentators:
(a) That the risk of loss should be on the vendor until title is conveyed.
Stone, Equitable Conversion by Contract (1913) 13 COL. L. Rav. 368, 385-387;
Griffin, Risk of Loss in Executory Land Contracts (1929) 4 NOTRE DAME
LAWY. 506.
(b) That risk of loss should be on the vendor until the time agreed upon for
conveyance of title. LANGDELL, BaIEF OF EQUITY JURISDICTION (2d ed. 1926)
58-65.
(c) That the risk of loss should be on the party in possession, whether vendor
or vendee. See note 18, infra.
(d) That the risk of loss should fall upon the vendor unless there is some-
1941]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
in any case: would the vendee be required to pay the full contract price
if the land which is the subject of the contract were completely de-
stroyed (e.g. by flood), thereby rendering specific performance by the
vendor absolutely impossible. 9
Although the vendee is considered, for purposes of dower, descent
and alienation, to receive an equitable estate in land at the date of the
making of the contract, none of the incidents of equitable ownership
are enforceable until the date set for performance of the contract. And
even then they receive no recognition if specific performance is impos-
sible.10 For these reasons it has been suggested: (1) Whatever equit-
able interests the vendee has under the contract being dependent upon
a right to specific performance, and substantial destruction of the sub-
ject matter of the contract being considered to render specific perform-
ance impossible, any accidental loss pending the fulfillment of the
contract should fall on the vendor.'1 (2) The ancient maxim "whatever
is agreed to be done is considered by equity to be done"'1 affords no
support to this application of the doctrine of equitable conversion, by
contract, for the courts recognize that nothing is agreed to be done until
the date set for performance. 13
)Perhaps the first of these criticisms is unwarranted, since equitable
conversion was consolidated into contract law by adoption from the
law applied to wills, 1 4 has always been considered to be effected by and
at the date of the contract,' 5 and is merely rendered imenforceable by
thing in the contract or the relations of the parties from which the court can
infer a differen6 intention. See notes (1920) 6 CoRN. L. Q. 111, (1930) 5 Wis.
L. Rzv. 239. See note 22, infra.
' Wilson v. Clark, 60 N. H. 352 (1880) (buildings worth $587.5D destroyed
by fire; remaining land valued at $62); Reife v. Osmers, 252 N. Y. 320, 169
N. E. 399 (1929) (tract taken by public domain; leaving only claim for money
award); Amundsen v. Severson, 41 S. D. 377 170 N. W. 633 (1919) (all but
30 acres of 120 acre tract washed awoy by Missouri River).
'0 Phinizy v. Guernsey, 111 Ga. 346, 36 S. E. 796, 50 L. R. A. 680 (1900)(performance impossible because of outstanding security deed; vendor in posses-
sion; loss falls on vendor) ; cf. Mehrens v. Knight, 29 Ga. App. 390, 115S. E.
506 (1922) (vendee in possession as tenant pending execution of contract and
payment of purchase price; vendor sells property to third party; vendee allowed
to recover previous partial payments plus the value of any improvements made,
less a deduction of the rental value of the land and any injury to the property
during the term of occupancy); Rhomberg v. Zapf, 201 Iowa 928, 208 N. W.
276 (1926) ; Lombard v. Chicago Sinai Congregation, 64 Ill. 477, (1872) (vendor
having option to withdraw).
" Stone, Equitable Conversion by Contract (1913) 13 COL. L. REv. 369, 389.
See note (1922) 6 MINN. L. Rnv. 513.
"Williston speaking of this maxim says: "Only the hoary age and frequent
repetition of this maxim prevents a general recognition' of its absurdity-and one
who accepts the maxim denies himself the effort of further thought." 2 WILLIsTON
oN CoNTRAcTs (1920) 1767.
" Simpson, Legislative Changes in the Law of Equitable Conversion by Con-
tract: I (1934) 44 YALn L. J. 559, n. 3. See notes (1936)' 25 Ky. L. J. 58, 166.
", See notes (1936) 25 Ky. L. J. 58. 63, (1937) 25 Ky. L. 3. 166.
1" See Bender v. Luckenba&k, 162 Pa. 18, 29 Atl. 295 (1894).
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impossibility of specific performance. 1 Furthermore, the doctrine has
proved beneficial in its every application except that of shifting risk of
loss upon the vendee.
It has been suggested that equity, in its escape from the rule of
Paine v. Meller, should revert to the old rule of Stent v. Bailis'7 which,
prior to 1801, imposed upon the vendor all risk of accidental loss by
fire until the date set for performance of a contract of sale. However,
Professor Williston's suggestion' 8 that the risk should fall on the party
in possession has met with greater approval. The California courts,' 9
for example, have found possession a satisfactory test. The burden of
loss then falls upon the party entitled to the rents and profits and in the
best position to protect the property.2 0 Insurance companies generally
make possession the test of transfer of ownership.21 And the parties
probably intend that all the risks and incidents of ownership shall pass
with possession of the land.
Doubtless any stereotyped rule for determining transfer of equitable
ownership will prove harsh in exceptional cases. However, the most
promising rule is one that would make the intent of the parties the
,determining test,22 in the light of the following factors: (1) the extent
of the property interests presently conveyed and reserved by the con-
tract, (2) the general intent of the parties as expressed in the instru-
ment, and (3) the prevailing conception of the market-place as to when
the risk of loss passes.
To explain the nature of the vendor's title when the vendee has
become equitable owner of the premises, the vendor is regarded as
trustee of the legal title for the benefit of the vendee.2 3 Such an idea
'6 See note 10, supra.
12 P. Wins. 213, 220, 24 Eng. Rep. 705, 706 (Ch., 1724) "If I should buy an
house and before such time as by the articles I am to pay for the same, the
house be burnt down by casualty of fire, I shall not in equity be bound to pay
for the house:' (dictum).
184 W.uisToN, CoNTRcrs (Rev. ed. 1936) §940; Williston, The Risk of
Loss after an Executory Contract of Sale in the Common Law (1895) 9 HARv.
L. REv. 106, 111-130; See notes (1922) 6 MINN. TI. REv. 513 (1923) 2 Wis.
L. REv. 174.
I'La Chance v. Brown, 41 Cal. App. 500, 183 Pac. 216 (1900); Lubarsky v.
havis, 99 Cal. App. 610, 279 Pac. 205 (1929) ; See note 7, supra.2 0In re Boyles' Estate, 154 Iowa 249, 134 N. W. 590, 38 L. R. A. (N.s.)
420 (1912) ; Tucker v. McLaughlin-Farrar Co., 36 Okla. 321, 129 Pac. 5 (1912) ;
Cf. Ashurst v. Peck, 101 Ala. 499, 14 So. 541 (1893). See 4 WILSTON, CONTRACTS(1920) 2624, n. 4 Contra: Williams v. Lilley, 67 Conn. 50, 34 Atl. 765 (1895).2 VANcE, INSUaNCE (2d ed. 1930) 719; RICHARS, INSURAN E (4th ed.
1932) §245.
"'This is the solution espoused by Dean Vanneman in Vanneman, Risk of
Loss in Equity Between the Date of Contract to Sell Real Estate and Transfer
of Title (1923) 8 MINN. L. REv. 127, 139 ff; Cf. POMEROY, SPEcIFIC PERFORMANCE
OF CoxTRAcrs (3d, ed. 1926) §434.
"
3Lombard v. Chicago Sinai Congregation, 64 Iii. 477 (1872) ("the vendee is
to be considered as the trustee of the -purchase money for the vendor, who is
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results in considerable confusion, for the vendor retains certain rights
and interests which are relatively incompatible with the legal concept
of a trust.24 He possesses a selfish security interest in the land com-
parable to a mortgagee's title ;25 the profits, use, and possession of the
land belong to the vendor-trustee until title passes, unless the contract
otherwise specifies;26 the vendor is in no sense a fiduciary nor is he
under any obligation to render an account ;27 and most courts regard
the right of the cestui-vendee as unenforceable until the date set for
performance. 28
Nevertheless this is the construction almost generally applied. The
early jurists explained it only by considering the property as held in a
sort of inchoate trust capable of maturing into an actual trust only at the
time set for performance, when all the vendor's security interests in the
land terminated. At that time, the situation of actual trust was con-
sidered for certain purposes to relate back to the date of making the
contract.
29
Many jurists, rejecting or overlooking this fiction, have adopted the
construction stated by Lord Hatterley that "the moment a contract for
sale and purchase is entered into ... the vendor becomes a constructive
trustee to the vendee."30 A constructive trust, however, is not generally
considered to arise until the moment a duty to convey becomes abso-
lute.31 Thus it is obvious that the entire fiction was an attempt to
explain how a vendor could hold title to land considered by equity to
be owned "for all intents and purposes" by the vendee. Had the courts
been a little more anxious to retain consistency in their rules of trust
than to explain the problem of equitable conversion, it is submitted that
they could have attained the same results by considering the construc-
regarded as trustee of the land for the vendee") ; Moore v. Taylor, 157 N. Y.
Supp. 921 (Sup. Ct., 1916). EAroN, EQuiTy (2d ed. 1923) 445, n. 49.
a' VANNEMAN, supra note 22, at 136; see note (1935) 24 Ky. L. J. 201.
" Lowenthal v. Homne Ins. Co. 112 Ala. 108, 20 So. 419 (1896); Gu v. H.
& D. Lumber Co., 6 Ga. App. 486, 65 S. E. 330 (1909) (holding that where the
vendor reserves legal title merely as security for the purchase price the legal
effect of the situation is not different from that which would arise if the vendor
had made a deed to the veidee and received a mortgage as security) ; see James
v. Boyd, 80 N. C. 258, 261 (1878). See EATON, EquiTY (2d ed. 1923) 242.
2 But see Reid v. Davis, 4 Ala. 83 (1842); Bostwick v. Beach, 105 N. Y. 661,
12 N. E. 32 (1887).
hiSee VANNEMAn , suPra note 24, at 136: "the purchaser cannot require of
him an accounting for the rents and profits". But see Bostwick v. Beach, 105
N. Y. 661, 12 N. E. 32 (1887).
2 Stone, Equitable Conversion by Contract (1913) 13 COL. L. REv. 369, 381-386
and cases cited. See note 36, infra.
2 See Shaw v. Foster, L. R. 5 H. L. 321, 338 (1872); see Wall v. Bright,
1 Jacob & W. 494, 50 (Ch., 1820). PomERoy, EQuiTy JURiSpRUDENC (4th, ed.
1918) §§1260, 1261.
" Shaw v. Foster, L. R. 5 H. L. 321, 338 (1872).
213 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES (1935) 1456; 3 ScoTT, TRUSTS (1939)
2320.
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tive trust to arise at the date set for performance of the contract rathet
than at the moment the contract is entered into.
RIGHT TO INSURANCE
In Rayner v. Preston,2 a vendee petitioned for specific performance
of a contract for the sale of land and for application upon the purchase
price of insurance moneys collected by his vendor pending performance
of the contract of sale. In denying the application for insurance, the
court held that the contract of sale acts only upon the property and
its necessary appurtenances and does not affect collateral contracts,
that the contract of insurance is a personal contract of indemnity and
unless assigned affords no right of action to any party not privity
thereto, and that the vendor occupies the position of trustee only in
respect to the property to be sold, of which the insurance policy is not
a part. Later, in Castellain v. Preston,3 the same court granted the
vendor's insurer the right to recover from the vendor what he had
secured from his vendee as the value of the building destroyed, apply-
ing the rule of subrogation. On the issues presented by the instant case
these two decisions determined the law of England until Parliament in
1922 yielded to the "vendee's rights of natural equity", and by statute
made the vendor trustee for the vendee of any insurance moneys col-
lected during.the life of a contract for the sale of land, "subject to any
stipulation to the contrary"3a
A decided majority of American courts have rejected the reasoning
of Rayner v. Preston and have permitted the vendee to secure applica-
tion of the vendor's insurance moneys upon the purchase price when
the vendee is the only party to suffer injury3 5 They have, however,
82 L. R. 18 Ch. D. 1 (1881); cf. King v. Preston, 11 La. Ann. 95 (1856)
(adopting same rule in Louisiana; but see Automatic Sprinkler Corp. v. Robin-
son-Slagle Lumber Co., 147 So. 542, 544 (La. App. 1933)); See Brownell v.
Board- of Education, 239 N. Y. 369, 372, 146 N. E. 630, 631 (1925). See notes
(1925) 25 CoL. L. REv. 477, (1925) 10 CORN. L. Q. 379.T L. R. 11 Q. B. D. 380 (1883).
U Law of Property Act, 1922, 12 & 13 Geo. V, c. 16, §105: "any money
becoming payable after the date of any contract for sale of -property under any
policy of assurance in respect of any damage to or destruction of property in-
cluded in such contract shall on the completion of such contract, but subject to
any stipulation to the contrary, be held or receivable by the vendor on behalf
of the purchaser and paid by the vendor to the purchaser on the completion of
the sale ... " This act was amended by Law of Property Act, 1925, 15 Geo. V.,
c. 20, §47 (2) subjecting the operation of the previous act (a) to any stipula-
tion to the contrary in the contract of sale, (b) to any requisite consents of the
insurers, and (c) to the payment by the purchaser of the premiums from the
date of the contract.
"Kaufman v. All Persons, 16 Cal. App. 388, 117 Pac. 586 (1911); Brady
v. Welsh, 204 N. W. 235 (Iowa 1925) ; Mattingly v. Springfield F. & M. Ins. Co.,
120 Ky. 768 83 S. W. 577 (1904); Win. Skinner Co. v. Houghton, 92 Md. 68,
48 Atl. 85 (1900); McGinley v. Forrest, 107 Neb. 309, 186 N. W. 74 (1921);
Millville Aerie 'F. 0. E. v. Weatherby, 82 N. J. Eq. 455, 88 Atl. 847 (Ch., 1913) ;
Turner v. Bryant, 152 App. Div. 601, 137 N. Y. Supp. 466 (3d Dep't 1912);
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recognized a power in the insurer to protect itself from the additional
responsibility by making its policies voidable upon a "change in in-
terest", "change in title", or termination of the "sole ownership" of
the insured.36 In allowing the vendee to reach the insurance, they have
variously ruled that the vendor who stands as trustee of the property
to the benefit of the vendee holds any insurance policy in the same
capacity;37 that equity will consider the insurance money to be substi-
tuted for the property held in trust by the vendor ;8s or that the probable
intent of the parties to have the insurance policy of one cover the
interests of both will be given legal effect by equity's effectuating an
assignment of the policy to this extent.39
The idea of constructive assignment, apparently recognized in only
one case,40 probably lacks an essential basis of fact. For insurance
Peck v. Hale, 30 Ohio -C. A. 473, 11 Ohio App. 418 (1919) ; Reed v. Lukens, 44
Pa. 200, 84 Am. Dec. 425 (1863) ; Brakhage v. Tracy, 13 S. D. 343, 83 N. W.
363 (1900). Contra: see note 7, supra.
Exceptions to the application of the American rule are recog'nized:
(a) When a condition precedent to the vendor's duty to convey has not been
performed. Amundsen v. Severson, 170 N. W. 633 (S. D. 1919); but see Sewell
v. Underhill, 197 N. Y. 168, 90 N. E. 430 (1910) (where conveyance was delayed
to secure a map mentioned in the deed, as a matter of convenience and not for
any matter essential to transfer of title).
(b) Where contract arises from sheriff's sale. Cropper v. Brown, 76 N. J. Eq.
406, 74 Atl. 987 (Ch., 1909) (applying rule and surveying cases in point);
Contra: Plimpton v. Farmer's Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 43 Vt. 497 (1871).
(c) Where vendee has option contract to purchase. Williams v. Lilley, 67
Conn. 50, 34 Atl. 765 (1895) (lessee with option to purchase-applied general
rule allowing recovery). Contra: Wheeler v. Gahan, 206 Ky. 366, 267 S. W.
227 (1924); Strong v. Moore, 105 Ore. 12, 207 Pac. 179 (1922). See note (1923)
23 A. L. R. 1225.
(d) Where vendor cannot convey good title. See note 10, supra.
"eSee COOKE, CASES ON EQUITY (2d ed. 1932) 808, n. 24; see I AMrS, CASES
IN EQUITr JURiSDIcTiON (1904) 241, n. 4.
(a) A contract of sale breaches a "change in interest' condition. Skinner v.
Houghton, 92 Md. 68, 48 Atl. 85 (1900).
(b) A contracd to sell is not generally a breach of a "change of title" condi-
tion. Smith v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 9 -Cal. 323, 27 Pac. 738 (1891) ; Phoenix Ins.
Co. v. Caldwell, 187 Ill. 73, 58 N. E. 314 (1900). Contra: Davidson v. Hawkeye
Ins. Co., 71 Iowa 532, 32 N. W. 514 (1887).
(c) A contract to sell is generally a breach of a "sole ownership" condition.
Clay Co. v. Huron Co., 31 Mich. 346 (1875); Collins v. London Ins. Co., 165
Pa. 298, 30 Atl. 942 (1895).
17 Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Mitchell, 67 Il1. 43 (1873) ;' Skinner Co. v. Houghton, 92
Md. 68, 48 Atl. 85 (1900); People's Ry. v. Spencer, 156 Pa. 85, 27 Atl. 113(1893) ; Russell v. Elliott, 45 S. D. 184, 186 N. W. 824 (1922) ; See Phinizy v.
Guernsey, 111 Ga. 346, 349, 36 S. E. 796, 680 (1900) ; Rayner v. Preston, L. R.
18 Ch. D. 1, 13 (1881) (Lord James' dissent).8 Williams v. Lilley, 67 Conn. 50, 62, 34 At. 765, 770 (1895); Godfrey v.
Alcorn, 215 Ky. 465, 284 S. W. 1094, 51 A. L. R. 925 (1926); cf. Skinner Co.
v. Houghton, 92 Md. 68, 48 Atl. 85 (1900); see Reed v. Lukens, 44 Pa. St. 200(1863).
" See note (1935) 23 Ky. L. J. 505, 507.
"Ins. Co. v. Updegraff, 21 Pa. St. 513 (1853); cf. Callahan v. Linthicum,
43 Md. 97 (1875).
[Vol. 19
NOTES AND COMMENTS
companies insure the interests of vendor and vendee separately,' a
vendor could hardly be said to offer gratuitous protection to the yen-
dee's interest, and contracts of sale frequently expressly provide that
the vendor shall suffer any intervening loss by fire.
The substitution rule, as applied-in Kentu&ky,4 probably conforms
most with "the layman's ideas of equity". 43 Yet it obviously runs coun-
ter to the "personal contract of indemnity" 44 idea of insurance and
makes the insurance policy indemnify the land and not the insured.
But the fact that most fire insurance policies provide the insurer with
an option to repair or rebuild,45 rather than pay the value 6f the prop-
erty destroyed, affords some practical basis for the rule. For the build-
ing if reconstructed must necessarily be conveyed to the vendee should
specific performance be decreed.
In Phinizy v. Guernsey, the Georgia court adopted the first rule
suggested, that whenever "the vendors would have held the legal title
as trustees for the vendee, then they would likewise have held title to
the insurance in the same capacity." 46 However, neither an express47
nor a resulting trust 48 can be created by a simple contract for the sale
of land. And before the vendor can be declared a constructive trustee
of the insurance, the court must find that he would be unjustly enriched
at the expense of the vendee.49
In determining whether to impose a -constructive trust upon the
vendee, the following factors are considered important: (1) the quan-
" "Vendor and vendee have separate insurable interests in the property, which
they may protect by insurance, but the interest must be specifically disclosed."
RICHARDS, LAW OF INSURANCE, (4th ed. 1932) 68.2 Mattingly v. Springfield F. & M. Ins. Co., 120 Ky. 768, 83 S. W. 577(1904).
"' See Rayner v. Preston, L. R. 18 Ch. D. 1, 15 (1881) (Lord James' dissent);
cf. Brownell v. Board of Education, 239 N. Y. 369, 146 N. E. 630 (1925) (Justice
Pound speaks of Lord James' discussion of an insurance policy as benefiting any-
one beside the named beneficiary as savoring "of the layman's ideas of equity, but
they are not the law.')
""A contract of insurance is essentially personal, each party having in view
the character, credit, and conduct of the other." VANCE, INSURANCE (2d ed.
1930) 69. And this applies particularly to fire insurance contracts. Vance, op.
cit. at 73.
" See RIcHaS, LAw oF INSURANCE (4th ed. 1932) §301.
" Phinizy v. Guernsey, 111 Ga. 346, 36 S. E. 796 (1900).
"' "A trust ... is a fiduciary relationship with respect to property.., which
arises as a result of a manifestation of an intent to create it." RESTATEMENT,
LAW or TRUSTS (1935) 'v. I, §2. No intent to create a trust can possibly be
inferred from a simple contract to convey land.
,' "A resulting trust arises where a transfer of property is made under
circumstances which raise an inference that the person making the transfer or
causing it to be made did not intend the transferee to have the beneficial interest
in the property transferred." RESTATEMENT, LAW OF RESTiTunON (1937) 642.
" "Where a person holding title to property is subject to an equitable duty
to convey it to another on the ground that he would be unjustly enriched if he
were permitted to retain it, a constructive trust arises.' RESTATEmENT, LAW OF
RESTITUTION (1937) §160, p. 640.
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tum of interest in the land presently conveyed by the contract and the
notice afforded the vendee that he has an insurable interest ;5 (2) the
apparent desire of American courts to protect all equitable interests
arising under the contract of sale'as evidenced by the widespread rejec-
tion of the rule of Rayner v. Preston; (3) the power of insurance
companies to protect themselves by making their policies voidable upon
a change in interest and ownership of the insured; (4) the general
misconception of the market-place that the vendor is owner and sus-
tains all risk of loss pending the performance of the contract;r' (5) the
fact that the vendee is the only party to suffer loss where the equitable
conversion theory is applied and specific performance decreed; and
(6) the effect, upon the vendor's "unjust enrichment", of the fact that
the vendor has paid the premiums upon the policy, and of the insurer's
right to be subrogated to a part of the purchase price. 2
Actually, the mortgagor-mortgagee relation affords the most helpful
analogy. The vendor's legal title is considered by most courts as a bare
security title comparable to that of a mortgagee.53 And it is often sug-
gested that the rules of insurance there applied offer a ready solution
to the instant problem.54 Under the law of mortgages, though the
insurer purports to insure the entire value of the building at prevailing
premium rates, it actually indemnifies the insured mortgagee only for
what loss he sustains, discounting the amount of money previously paid
on the mortgage notes. Furthermore, it succeeds by subrogation to the
mortgagee's right of action against the mortgagor upon the unpaid
notes.5 5 If these rules were adopted, the vendee would be denied any
"I.e., does the vendee secure possession, right to rents and profits, and a right
to deal with the property as his own, or' are these rights to pass only with title?
See note 17, supra. Qtuere. should bond for title afford the vendee notice that
he has an insurable interest? Bruce v. Jennings, 10 S. E. (2d) 56 (Ga. 1940).
See Rayner v. Preston, L. R. 18 Ch. D. 1, 16 (1881) (Lord James' dissent).
' This argument is important if the insurer is permitted to recover b subroga-
tion whatever the vendor realizes on the contract as collateral indemnity for the
building destroyed. Davidson v. Hawkeye Ins. Co., 71 Iowa 532, 32 N. W. 514
(1887); Sussex Ins. Co. v. Woodruff, 26 N. J. Law 541 (1857); Phoenix
Assurance Co. v. Spooner, (1905) 2 K. B. 753. See note 33, stupra. Furthermore
there is authority that the insurer 'will be estopped to assert its right to subro-
gation neither by continuing the policy with notice that the vendor holds a mere
security title, nor by payment of the insurance money to the vendor when the
vendee suffers the only loss. Mahan v. Home Ins. Co., 205 Mo. App. 592, 226
S. W. 593 (1920); Gottingham v. Fireman's Ins. Co., 90 Ky. 439, 14 S. W.
417 (1890).
"White v. Gilman, 138 Cal. 375, 71 Pac. 436 (1903); see Candler v. Dodge
Lumber Co., 34 Ga. App. 289, 129 S. E. 289 (1925); Jones v. Boyd, 80 N. C.
258, 261 (1878); Crawford v. Allen, 189 N. C. 434, 444, 127 S. E. 126, 127
(1925).
511 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES (1935) 75.
"' Gould v. Maine Farmers' Mutual Ins. Co., 114 Me. 416, 96 Ati. 732 (1916);
International Trust Co. v. Beardman, 149 Mass. 158, 21 N. E. 239 (1889) ; Leyden
v. Lawrence, 79 N. J. Eq. 113, 81 Atl. 121 (Ch., 1911) (right of insurer to be
subrogated to mortgagee's claim against mortgagor); Stuyvesant Ins. Co. v.
Reid, 171 N. C. 513, 88 S. E. 779 (1916) (chattel mortgage); see Suttles v.
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interest whatever in the vendor's insurance money. But such a result
might prove inequitable where, unlike the mortgagor, the vendee is not
afforded notice of his need to insure either by a long standing rule of
law or by an actual transfer of legal title and an unmistakable change
of interest.
DIsAvowAL
Apparently no previous case has arisen in which a vendee has dis-
avowed, as he did in the instant case, all interest in the insurance of
his vendor.56 In Skinner v. Houghton,5 7 the vendee represented to the
vendor's agent, subsequent to the making of the contract and before
the fire, that he intended to remove the buildings on the premises upon
acquiring title and would not be interested in an assignment of the
policy, yet thought it wise that the vendor insure the buildings for her
own security. There the Maryland Supreme Court found no disavowal
of interest in the insurance, but held the insurance money "justly due
to the vendee who had sustained the only loss."' 8
It is generally conceded, moreover, that such an intent is not con-
clusive on a court when unjust enrichment at another's expense justifies
a finding of constructive trust;519 and it is submitted that despite a
finding of unequivocal disavowal of interest in the instant case, by the
rules of constructive trust, petitioner's plea for application of the insur-
ance should have been granted.
STATUTES
Perhaps the most adequate solution to the confusing problem is sug--
gested by the statute enacted in England.60 In 1934, because of the vast
diversity of rules applied in the various states and to alleviate the diffi-
Vickery, 179 Ga. 752, 756, 177 S. E. 715, 717 (1934) (security deed). Contra:
Callahan v. Linthicum, 43 Md. 97 (1875). But see Home Ins. Co. v. Marshall,
48 Kans. 235, 26 Pac. 161 (1892). See VANCE, I1SURANCE (2d ed. 1930) 652-
654; RIcHnARs, LAw OF INsURAwCE (4th ed. 1932Y §276. Conversely, the mort-
gagee has no interest in the mortgagor's insurance in the absence of any agree-
ment to the contrary. Suttles v. Vickery, 179 Ga. 152, 177 S. E. 714 (1934);
Bryan v. Old Colony Ins. Co., 213 N. C. 319, 196 S. E. 345 (1937). See
RicHARms, LAw OF INSuRANcE (4th ed. 1932)'§65.
"6 But see Dumbrack v. Neal, 55 W. Va. 565, 49 S. E. 303 (1904) where the
grantor of a deed of trust assigned insurance policy to the beneficiary, who had
refused assignment and wanted nothing to do with the policy, making it payable
to the trustee as his interest might appear. Fire occurred while first note was
due and unpaid. Trustee gave notice of sale and cestui brings action to restrain
sale and secure application of the insurance money upon the purchase price.
Petition denied, cestui's equitable interest having terminated.
793 Md. 68, 48 AtI. 86 (1900).
58 Skinner v. Houghton, 92 Md. 68, 91, 48 Ad. 85, 90 (1900).59
"It is created regardless of the intent of the -parties and naturally directly
against the intent of the defendant. As is well. stated by a learned writer, it is
a 'fraud-rectifying' and not an 'intent-enforcing' trust." 3 BoGErT, TRUSTS AND
TRUSTEEs (1935) 79. 60 See note 34, supra.
19411
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
culties encountered in particular states such as New York,61 wherein as
many as four different and conflicting doctrines have been applied, the
National Conference Commissioners on Uniform State Laws considered
a draft of a Uniform Purchaser and Vendor Risk Act. 62 This -draft
would have granted the greatest possible security to the vendee, per-
mitting him, in the event of subsequent destruction of the subject matter
by fire, either to revoke the contract and recover what portion of the
purchase price 'he has previously paid if he be out of possession, or
to secure specific performance and application of his vendor's insurance
upon the purchase price whether he be in possession or not. And appar-
ently the terms of this statute were to be enforceable regardless of any
previous disavowal the vendee may have made concerning his interest
in the vendor's policy. But in affording the vendee who is out of pos-
session the option either to revoke the contract if it proves unfavorable
or to enforce performance without risk of loss if it proves advantageous,
the proposed act would have given the vendee an advantage dispropor-
tionate to the burden placed on the vendor. It is submitted, however,
that this criticism could be avoided by a change in the provisions of the
" Bruce v. Allisoun, 56 N. Y. 366 (1874) (denied vendee application of insur-
ance) ; Bostwick v. Beach, 105 N. Y. 661, 12 N. E. 32 (1887) (granted vendor
specific performance, allowing vendee set-off to extent of damage by deterioration) ;
Doty v. Rennselaer Ins. Co., 188 App. Div. 29, 176 N. Y. Supp. 55 (3d Dep't
1919) (applied substitution theory, ordering application of insurance upon the
purchase price); See Brownell v. Board of Education, 239 N. Y. 369, 373, 146
N. E. 630, 631 (1925) (adopting reasoning of Rayner v. Preston that only
named beneficiary can benefit from insurance policy). Compare Conlin v.
Osborne, 161 Cal. 659, 120 Pac. 755 (1912) with Lubarsky v. Chavis, 99 Cal.
App. 610, 279 Pac. 205 (1929).2The following proposed act was considered by the Conference while sitting
in Committee of the Whole and is presented and discussed in Simpson, Legislative
Changes in the Law of Equitable Conversion by Contract: II, (1934) 44 YALE
L. J. 754, 769-773.
"Ahy contract hereafter made in this state for the -purchase and sale of realty
shall be interpreted as imposing upon the parties the following rights and duties,
unless the contract expressly provides otherwise:
(a) If before transfer of the legal title, or the possession of the subject matter
of the contract, all or a material part thereof is accidentally destroyed or taken
by eminent domain, the vendor cannot enforce the contract, and the purchaser is
entitled to recover any portion of the price that he has paid.
(b) If after the transfer of the legal title, or of the possession of the sub-ject matter of the contract, all or any part thereof is accidentally destroyed or is
taken" by eminent domain, the purchaser is not thereby relieved of a duty to pay
the price or entitled to recover any portion thereof that -he has paid.
(C) Where a vendor receives compensation from insurance or otherwise for
such destruction or taking, the purchaser shall be entitled to enforce the contract
with an abatement of the price to the extent of such compensation.
d) Where a purchaser receives compensation from insurance or otherwise
for such destruction or taking, the vendor shall be entitled either to have such
compensation applied to the payment of the price to the extent that is necessary
or, at the option of the purchaser, applied to the restoration of the subject
matter."
As adopted however the act omits any provision for application of insurance.
HANDBOOK oF NATiONAL CONFE RECE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNnoaM STATE
L.Aws (1935) 139.
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act, so that the act would provide substantially as follows (changes are
in italics):
"Any contract hereafter made in this state for the purchase and sale
of realty shall be interpreted as imposing upon the parties the following
rights and duties, unless the contract provides otherwise:
(a) If, before transfer of the legal title, or of the possession of
the subject matter of the contract, all or a material part thereof is
accidentally destroyed or is taken by eminent domain, the vendor cannot
enforce the contract if the vendee elects to revoke it, in which case the
vendee is entitled to recover any portion of the price he has paid; if the
vendee elects to perform the contract he shall have no interest in the
insurance of his vendor.
(b) If, after transfer of the legal title, or of the possession of the
subject matter of the contract, all or any part thereof is accidentally
destroyed or is taken by eminent domain, the purchaser is not relieved
of the duty to render specific performance, nor may he recover all or
any part of the purchase price that he has paid, but he is entitled to
secure an abatement of the purchase price to the extent of any cor-
pensation the vendor receives as collateral security for the property
destroyed: Provided that if said collateral security be insurance the'
vendee shall pay into court a sum equal to the premiums paid by the.
vendor from the date of the contract until the date of the accident,
before any abatement in the purchase price shall be ordered.
(c) Where a purchaser receives compensation from insurance or
otherwise for such destruction or taking, the vendor shall be entitled
either to have such compensation applied to the payment of the price
to the extent that is necessary or, at the option of the purchaser, applied
to the restoration of the subject matter."
V. LAMAR GfmGER, JR.
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